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The present work aspires to provide a comprehensive analysis of the policy 
developments through which European-level prescriptions regarding the liberalization 
of national electricity markets have been accommodated within the domestic policy 
contexts of two new member states of the European Union: Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic. Despite being subjected to uniform demands, adaptation to community 
regulatory provisions in the two countries has prompted divergent patterns of policy 
change, resulting in full compliance in the Czech Republic and a failure to meet EU 
objectives in Bulgaria. In order to address the observed inconsistency the envisaged 
research identifies a causal link between the outcomes of regulatory compliance and the 
influence of utility regulation as a sector-specific EU governance pattern on the 
dynamics of resource re-distribution at the domestic level. A major concern of the 
research is how contextual factors, such as incumbent power balances across actor 
populations in the target policy area condition the impacts of EU inputs on domestic 
policy decisions. In this respect the work hypothesizes that due to transition “sediments” 
in the new EU member states external rules may be selectively applied in order to match 
the existing realities and lead to outcomes that diverge from the initial regulatory intent. 
 
   
Abstrakt 
Tato práce se pokouší nabídnout komplexní analýzu vývoje politiky, jejímž 
prostřednictvím byly evropské předpisy, týkající se liberalizace národních trhů s 
elektřinou,  přizpůsobeny domácímu politickému kontextu Bulharska a České republiky 
jako dvou nových členských států Evropské unie. Přesto, že byla vystavena jednotným 
požadavkům, adaptace na unijní regulační opatření v obou zemích byla odlišná co do 
vývoje příslušných politik s tím, že zatímco Česká republika byla schopná unijním 
požadavkům vyhovět, Bulharsko neuspělo. Výzkum, jehož cílem je vysvětlit tento 
nesoulad, identifikuje příčinnou souvislost mezi výsledky dodržování regulačních 
opatření a vlivem regulační politiky jako sektorově specifického způsobu uplatnění 
evropského modelu vládnutí na dynamiku přerozdělování zdrojů na domácí úrovni. 
Pozornost se soustřeďuje na kontextuální faktory, např. na to, jak rovnováha stávajících 
mocenských struktur v relevantních populacích daných oblastí podmiňuje dopad 
evropských rozhodnutí na domácího rozhodování. V tomto ohledu je vyslovena 
hypotéza, že s ohledem na tranzitivní "sedimenty" v nových členských státech EU 
mohou být vnější pravidla odchylována selektivním způsobem tak, aby vyhovovala 
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At its core the present research effort is informed by two key theoretical conceptions 
drawn from the current Europeanization literature. Early polity-centered Europeanization 
approaches have concentrated on studying domestic change induced by existing structural 
“misfits” between supranational arrangements and institutional settings in the member states of 
the European Union (Cowles et al., 2001, Börzel and Risse, 2003). Those analytical attempts 
pose a vertical “chain-of-command” logic of interaction where top-down pressures result in 
increasing cross-national convergence. The “goodness of fit” logic has been questioned by 
authors, who advance an alternative, “bottom-up” approach to Europeanization (Radaelli, 2002). 
Bottom-up research designs put the emphasis of national adaptation on the specific attributes of 
domestic policy contexts. Thus, EU inputs (both pressures and incentives) are accommodated 
into domestic frameworks, depending on existing administrative traditions and actor preferences, 
defined at different points in time. The result is divergence, rather than uniformity in policy 
outcomes.  
A third group of scholars have aspired to incorporate the existing Europeanization approaches in 
holistic research frameworks, accentuating on the central significance of the distinct governance 
patterns at work in different policy areas (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, Bauer et al., 2007). Thus, 
they distinguish between policy areas, where the EU positively prescribes concrete models and 
formalized procedures for their implementation, and sectors, where the EU works through 
negative integration, imposing specific restrictions to the behavior of domestic actors without 
prescribing particular institutional outcomes.  
In the latter case national administrations are provided with considerable institutional discretion 
for adjustment. Therefore, EU rules create an environment, where “competitive selection” (Olsen, 
2002) alters the strategic position of domestic actors, eventually challenging the existing balance 
of power. Here, the incumbent patterns of resource distribution and different trajectories of 
institutional building come to the fore as factors conditioning policy choices.  
Utility regulation is one such area as within it EU competition-based rules aim at removing 
competitive distortions, impeding the functioning of the common market, while the concrete 
mode of implementation is up to the member states. It represents a specific implementation 
context where external policy goals affect negatively the interests of major domestic policy actors 
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(former natural monopolies), which at the same time have a major say in negotiating the exact 
parameters of the reform. Concurrently, the abolishment of distortive practices provides 
opportunities for new competitors to enter the policy domain. 
While studies focusing on this so-called “differential empowerment” of domestic actors have 
mostly covered older EU member states (Héritier and Knill, 2000, Eising and Jabko, 2001, 
Lodge, 2002, Tatcher, 2006, Bulmer at al., 2007), there are very few research efforts targeting 
explicitly domestic compliance to EU regulatory requirements in the new member states in 
Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time in those countries particular contextual traits, 
related to the formation of state-corporate relations during post-communist transition, create 
conditions for extremely disproportionate patterns of domestic resource distribution. Thus, 
existing path dependencies have produced tight clientelist networks and state capture 
opportunities, far exceeding the scope of the so-called “iron triangles”, associated with regulatory 
capture in utilities in Western democracies (Stigler, 1971). It is expected that such advocacy 
coalitions would attempt to keep the existing competitive distortions, on which they thrive, 
blocking access to new entrants, or rather adapt the externally imposed rules to existing domestic 
practices in order to maximize their profits. Therefore, in new member states instead of 
restricting the dominance of entrenched “policy monopolies” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002), EU 
rules might be indeed achieving the reverse effect by introducing new opportunities for 
extraction. Thus far the potential for selective rule adjustment has not been sufficiently addressed 
in existing Europeanization literature. 
The current diploma thesis intends to address this gap by focusing on the dynamics of domestic 
regulatory compliance in a specific area of utility regulation (electricity market liberalization) 
within the policy contexts of two new member states of the European Union: Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic. 
In this regard the work suggests a hypothesis, according to which in policy contexts, determined 
by the persistence of historically-situated exchange relations, such as state capture and 
clientelism, EU regulations may be intentionally and selectively adapted by domestic actors to 
existing patterns of behavior and in the process veer away from the set of objectives, laid out in 
the original rule design. Consequently, by looking at two particular policy environments the 
research attempts to answer whether rule transposition in new EU member states has resulted in 
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improved regulatory performance or has widened the discrepancy between legislation and 
practice. Also, it speculates that adaptation to EU regulatory models may exacerbate, rather than 
attenuate the impact of existing capture practices in those countries. 
The formulated hypothesis will be tested by comparing variation in domestic responses to EU 
electricity liberalization requirements, taking advantage of an identified divergence in compliance 
outcomes in Bulgaria and Czech Republic (no compliance vs. full compliance). The target is to 
reveal which domestic factors account for the results of rule transposition in both countries. Also, 
a main concern is how and whether identified capture practices affect the patterns of power 
distribution in domestic actor constellations, and are thus reflected in policy agendas and the 
resulting compliance choices. The research also strives to explore how the accommodation of EU 
inputs by domestic actors in those contexts has influenced the existing institutional equilibria: has 
it led to altering the existing opportunity structures or it has augmented the existing power 
asymmetries. It, therefore, incorporates both top-down and bottom up Europeanization 
dimensions, paying specific attention to the evolution of policy decisions over time.  
The first chapter of the diploma thesis provides a review of the conceptual frameworks, 
theoretical models and empirical findings relevant to the scope and objectives of the current 
work. Europeanization as an explanatory framework, dealing with domestic adaptation to EU 
regulatory provisions, is put under particular scrutiny. A separate angle of the review focuses on 
early theory of regulatory capture, while the related notions of state capture and clientelism are 
also briefly examined. Additionally, the review brings in scholarly contributions on policy 
equilibriums and the balancing mechanisms that trigger policy change. Further discussed are 
specific contextual features facilitating the formation of entrenched policy subsystems in the area 
of electricity market liberalization and the domestic policy settings of Central and Eastern 
European states.  
The second chapter concentrates on research design. It introduces the conceptual framework 
standing at the heart of the conducted research. Included are concepts, such as EU inputs, 
domestic contexts and policy outcomes, as defined within the scope of the current work. The 
chapter also discerns the key methodological aspects, informing the realization of the envisaged 
empirical research. Specific attention is given to identifying the domestic factors conditioning the 
results of regulatory compliance. The motives behind the selection of the individual cases are 
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provided in a separate subsection. The research design determines two major causal patterns 
accounting for the dynamics of policy change within the selected policy environments. Finally, 
the constraints limiting the validity of the research are also exposed. 
The selected country cases are subjected to a detailed empirical research in the third chapter. The 
logic of research in each case follows the progression of domestic variables identified in the 
research design. Thus, separate attention is given to the level of liberalization, the domestic 
reform potential, the pattern of power distribution, the level of state capture and the salience of 
electricity market liberalization in the selected policy contexts.  
The concluding chapter of the thesis includes a summary and discussion of the research findings. 
The reached conclusions largely correspond to the proposed causal patterns, while the work finds 


















1. Review of existing literature  
A core issue having a bearing on the ideational underpinnings of the current research 
refers to the relevance of Europeanization as an explanatory approach applicable to studying the 
influence of European Union (EU) regulatory policies on policy outcomes in the domestic 
contexts of its member-states. Contemporary debate on the subject confirms that Europeanization 
has reached a level of conceptual systematization and theoretic precision justifying its utilization 
as a tool for in-depth analytical attempts. However, putting Europeanization at work demands a 
number of basic clarifications regarding its scope and content.  
An important discussion in Europeanization literature revolves around the extent to which the 
concept of Europeanization has moved away from “first generation” polity-centered studies, 
concentrating on supranational institution-building and evolution of distinct European-level 
structures of governance” (Cowels et al., 2001). Focusing on the redistribution of power between 
actors and institutions at both European and domestic levels early research in the 70s, 80s and 90s 
usually identified the potential outcomes as some form of “strengthening, weakening or 
transformation of the nation-state” (Börzel, 1999, p.574). Proponents of competing regional 
integration approaches, such as intergovernmentalism (showcased most comprehensively by 
Moravcsik, 1991, 1993), and neo-functionalism (Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998, 2012), disagree 
over the degree of manifestation of supranationality in the emerging European community, while 
new governance paradigms point at possible fundamental transformations subverting the 
decision-making authority of traditional governing nodes (e.g. multi-level governance, 
spearheaded by authors, such as Hooghe and Marks, 1996, 2001, Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999).  
The focus of early studies on European integration has been subjected to considerable criticism 
by a slate of more recent, mostly post-2000 authors (Knill, 2001, Bulmer, 2007). What seriously 
undermines the explanatory power of classic integration concepts according to Bulmer is their 
explicit concentration on the dynamics and outcomes of European-level developments, while the 
underlying processes of institutional change at the domestic level have been addressed only 
indirectly or often completely disregarded (Bulmer, 2007, p. 49). Moreover, as Knill argues early 
research efforts have made crucial omissions in terms of providing relevant factors conditioning 
the course of such processes, including the extent to which supranational integration has led to 
changes in domestic institutions or the direction of the occurring changes (Knill, 2001, p.12).  
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As a consequence, several conceptual and theoretical approaches address the indentified 
loopholes by re-orienting Europeanization towards studying the impacts of (already perceived as) 
distinct European-level governance structures on key domestic political processes and 
institutional properties (Börzel, 1999, Börzel and Risse, 2003, Cowles et al., 2001). For example, 
purveyors of classic “top-down” analytical efforts, such as Cowles et al. discuss supranational 
developments only in relation to their ontological relevance as a source of adaptational pressures, 
while paying major attention to analyzing the structural changes brought about in the ensuing 
processes of domestic adjustment. A key argument here is that Europeanization emphasizes 
domestic conditions, as pressures “from above” might not necessarily translate into eventual 
changes in the absence of factors that facilitate (or obstruct) the influence of such forces (Cowles 
et al., 2001, p.2). Radaelli argues in this regard that Europeanization could be seen as a post-
ontological research agenda, where “theoretical effort…is all about bringing domestic politics 
back into our understanding of European integration” (Radaelli, 2004, p.3).   
A more detailed description of the “top-down” analytical framework provides a chance to map 
out the critical discussions, shaping the current state of the Europeanization field. A starting point 
of research in the developed outline is the presence of a structural miss-match, determined as a 
degree of “misfit” between European-level “processes, policies and institutions“ and such 
“processes, policies and institutions” at the domestic level (the so-called “goodness of fit” logic) 
(Cowles et al., 2001). This degree of incompatibility determines the intensity of pressure, where 
higher or lower levels of misfit imply stronger or weaker incentives for adjustment. As a second 
step the authors construct a palette of domestic factors intermediating the impact of “top-down” 
pressures on “domestic structures”, including inter alia multiple veto points, existing political and 
organizational cultures, formal and informal institutions, interests and identities etc. Thus, the 
logic of the depicted model can be illustrated by the following diagram (Radaelli, 2004): 
Pressure caused by European Integration => level of misfit => intervening factors => changes in 
domestic structures 
What immediately appears as problematic is the excessive focus on formal structures, 
mechanistic reconfigurations and institutional adjustment. In this respect Dyson and Goetz argue 
against attributing a fixed, absolute value to system-wide polity features and structural 
inconsistencies in search of “end state” effects, emphasizing the possibility of their interpretation 
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and renegotiation in the course of the policy process (Dyson and Goetz, 2003). On a more general 
level the issue falls within a broader debate on the development of contemporary institutionalism. 
Building on DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Giddens (1984), Gualini conceptualizes a clear-cut 
distinction between classical institutionalism, characterized by a “restricted, formalistic, 
prevailingly static conception of institutions” (institutionalization as a property) and “new” 
institutionalism, implying non-formalized institutional settings and modes of interaction 
(institutionalization as a process) (Gualini, 2004, p.61-62). The bottom line is that any holistic 
approach should reconcile the formal and processual dimensions of institutionalization in order to 
avoid deterministic explanations of change.  
Accordingly, Börzel and Risse (2003) bring in a number of precisions allowing the “top-down” 
approach to account for dynamism and agency. On the one hand, the authors re-conceptualize the 
scope of potential impacts on domestic arrangements by extending the list of affected 
components to “processes” and “policies” (to which Olsen also adds “cognitive and normative 
structures”) (Olsen, 2002) and distinguishing between policy and institutional misfits. On the 
other hand, they contextualize the reactions of existing agents of change by stipulating the factors 
influencing their behavioral patterns. Here, Börzel and Risse mostly draw on rational-choice 
theory (cost/benefit considerations) and social institutionalism (identity considerations, subjective 
factors, social expectations), while separating nominally the two sets of factors under two 
mechanisms of change – “consequentionalism” and “appropriateness”. Taking those authors’ 
contributions a step further and focusing specifically on policy areas Wade Jacoby first adds a 
third type of institutionalism – a historical one, dealing with historically situated constraints to 
institutional and policy choice - and second opts to disentangle the different modes and outcomes 
of the process of adaptation (which the author identifies as “emulation”) (Jacoby, 2006). Jacoby 
is also one of the scholars to emphasize the importance of policies as dynamic environments, 
where the outcomes of domestic adjustment are shaped by specific endogenous factors within 
policy areas (e.g. density of rules and regulations, level of coercion), as much as by the unique 
exogenous features of the policy contexts (e.g. networks of actor constellations) (Ibid).  
Approaching the “three-step” framework from a different perspective allows to bring into focus 
another crucial debate in Europeanization literature, concerning rivaling opinions regarding its 
“chain-of-command” logic and focus on pressures “from above”. Several authors contend that 
gearing top-down research designs to the dynamic features of adaptation processes (e.g. existing 
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actor networks) is still limited by the usage of a liner causal hypothesis, implying a narrow, static 
concept of “impact” and uni-directional patterns of reaction to “Europe (Radaelli, 2004). 
Attempts to forecast the (un)likeliness of reform by linking the number of veto-points and types 
of political leadership to potential results in mechanistic ways might predict the answers (Héritier 
and Knill, 2000). The expected “outcomes”, therefore, appear deterministic, suggesting similar 
homogenizing effects in different political and institutional contexts (Börzel, 1999) and 
increasing cross-national convergence (Bache, 2003). At the heart of this “convergence” 
paradigm is the assumed existence of an European “normative order, based on overreaching 
constitutive principles, structures and practices” (Olsen, 2002, p. 923), whose imposition in 
national environments is expected to shape domestic institutions in a uniform way, leading to 
increasing congruence of practices and rules. However, such a view is heavily contested by 
scholars and practitioners alike. On the one hand, authors point at the lack of a clear European 
model that could serve as a common gravitational pull to actors, situated in different institutional 
environments (Page and Wouters in Radaelli, 2000).  On the other hand, as shown by practical 
studies “there is more empirical evidence pointing towards a differential impact of Europe than 
towards convergence” (Radaelli, 2004, p.5). 
Furthermore, the relevance of “top-down” pressures as a trigger to domestic adaptation is 
challenged by an increasing number of Europeanization studies. On the macro level, Bulmer 
observes that the EU does not systematically produce “misfits” in the sense of stipulating 
concrete institutional designs and/or requiring specific formalized procedures for their 
implementation by national administrations. Therefore, “the goodness of fit” framework only 
works in policy areas where such models and procedures exist (Bulmer, 2007). In the absence of 
persistent institutional “misfits”, however, changes in domestic arrangement cannot be explained 
by coercive pressures, suggesting different mechanisms at work. Thus, Héritier and Knill view 
European inputs as a source of political leverage that might be exploited by domestic actors as a 
tool for opportunity-optimization within political interaction (Héritier and Knill, 2001). Examples 
are cases where the impacts of European developments coincide with endogenous processes, 
rendering irrelevant the extent of existing inconsistencies and providing domestic political 
entrepreneurs with an opportunity to legitimize policy choices (Morlino, 2003, p.7). 
Consequently, actor efforts to “improve their relative positions in the domestic political conflicts” 
by using the new opportunities alters the conditions under which change takes place in policy 
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arenas, leading to transformation of the existing opportunity structures (Héritier and Knill, 2000, 
p.2-3).  
The two mechanisms of change described above correspond to the forms of institutional 
isomorphism, defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as “coercive” and “mimetic” adaptation 
and identifying change developments in response to (respectively) “alterations in the rules 
governing policy areas” or the behavior of a dominant actor. In a complementary contribution, 
Radaelli (2002) distinguishes between “vertical” and “horizontal” Europeanization, where the 
former stands for imposition of rules in a hierarchical progression between the European level as 
the locus of policy formulation and the domestic level, where policy has to be implemented. In 
contrast, “horizontal” Europeanization implies a different process of change in the absence of 
pressures, where adaptations are triggered by the market (regulatory competition) or socialization 
(framing). Moreover, in the case of “vertical” adjustments the outcomes of Europeanization are 
associated with convergence of practices, while “horizontal” adaptation implies differential 
empowerment of the actors, populating separate policy arenas (Radaelli, 2002).   
In the context of the foregoing considerations several conceptualization efforts have opted for 
approaching Europeanization from a different, entirely actor-based perspective (as opposed to the 
institution-based perspective presented above) (Knill, 2001). Those challenge traditional 
conceptions of domestic adaptation as the outcome of endogenous prescriptions. Even if tangible 
adaptational pressures are generated by existing institutional “misfits” their presence cannot 
always explain change: domestic actors might adapt to “Europe” independently of such pressures 
(Radaelli, 2006). Therefore, adaptation should be entirely associated with domestic processes and 
how European inputs have been accommodated within a specific policy sector at home. Gualini 
(2003) explains this approach by distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous 
interpretation of institutional change. In the first instance the focus of Europeanization is on 
institutions as sets of structures, constraining the behavior of domestic actors, where the latter are 
forced to “internalize” exogenous solutions as they threaten the persistence of existing domestic 
arrangements in the conditions of low legitimacy and uncertainty. On the contrary, in endogenous 
interpretations the focus is on the dynamics of emergence of institutions, where collective action 
is both an incremental outcome of change and, by influencing the conditions for creation of new 
intuitional settings, a catalyst of institutional change. As a result, European and domestic 
environments are interlinked in a process of continuous co-evolution and mutual re-adjustment, 
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where policies shape the parameters of polities and vise versa (Gualini 2002, p.63-71). In a 
complementary study Börzel somehow mechanistically conceptualizes Europeanization as a 
“two-process”, involving both “uploading” content to the supranational level by EU member 
states and then “downloading” what has been negotiated within the domestic contexts of 
member-states (Börzel, 2001).  
The above discussion is consistent with the emergence of so-called “bottom-up” approaches to 
Europeanization, where institutional changes are studied through the prism of domestic systems 
of interaction as a way to research how the accommodation of Europe is reflected in the evolution 
of institutional settings in different policy areas (e.g. Tatcher, 2006). According to Radaelli it is in 
line with the recent developments in European governance research, as well as the increasing 
importance of domestic policy arenas as host environments of institutionalization developments 
with the European Union (Radaelli, 2006). Two advantages of “bottom-up” approaches are 
important within the scope of the current work. On the one hand, a focus on domestic 
arrangements allows identifying domestic policy changes with rivaling mechanisms of 
Europeanization (Giuliani, 2003). On the other hand, by switching the role of Europeanization 
from an explanatory framework for domestic change (structure) to the problem that needs to be 
explained (process) (Radaelli, 2006, p. 4), utilizing “bottom-up” approaches provide an 
opportunity to account for policy outcomes through investigating the process of domestic change. 
Despite their benefits, however, “bottom-up” approaches also seem to suffer from at least two 
important limitations. First, as they share the same pool of intervening variable with “top-down” 
approaches (derived from institutionalist theories) the validity of the achieved results in “bottom-
up” studies could be questioned as the absence of concrete pressures does not represent a 
sufficient marker of a bottom-up dynamic. Second, by putting the emphasis of Europeanization 
on the temporal dimension of policy (and in the long term polity) change, as well as the gradual 
evolution of policies such approaches seem not to be particularly suitable for investigating abrupt 
policy shifts in response to exogenous or endogenous shocks. 
Aiming at holistic synthesizes a few studies have attempted to integrate the existing 
Europeanization approaches into comprehensive analytical frameworks, conducive to studying 
patterns of variation in domestic policy outcomes within the EU. Two of the most accomplished 
efforts in this regard have been carried out by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) and Bauer, Knill and 
Pitschel (2007), both of which incorporate institutionalist and actor-centered elements in their 
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research outlines. Their basic tenet is that explaining the nature and varying degree of change at 
the domestic level should be approached through the functioning of different Europeanization 
mechanisms, depending on the dominant governance patterns operating in particular policy 
sectors. In this context the literature distinguishes between policies, where supranational 
regulation aims at controlling and remedying harmful effects caused by the functioning of the 
common European market (e.g. social and consumer protection, agriculture, environmental 
policy etc.) and policies, where European-level regulation is intended to ensure that the market 
functions effectively (e.g. energy, transport, telecommunications etc.) (Radaelli, 2002, p.6).  
In the first type of governance mechanism, named by Bauer et al. as “governance by compliance” 
the intention behind European-level regulatory regimes is to impose constraints on domestic 
actors in order to establish “a sound environment” for the participants of the market (Bauer et al., 
2007, p.408). Within such policy areas governance operates via positively prescribing concrete 
negotiated solutions, whose vertical introduction (or “downloading”) in different national 
contexts is designed to achieve specific regulatory goals (e.g. uniform application of social 
protection standards, environmental safeguards etc.) (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). The impacts of 
Europeanization, therefore, are entirely based on “top-down” coercive pressures: adaptation 
processes are driven by exogenous constraints and incentives to legitimize particular policy 
choices in order to sustain the survival of institutional and/or organizational settings (Gualini, 
2002, p. 65). In terms of impacts community policy measures are directed explicitly towards 
“first order” instrumental adjustments in national regulatory arrangements (Hall, 1993), while 
domestic institutional compliance is crucial for the effectiveness of policy outcomes (being thus 
the focus of considerable EU scrutiny, including through investigation by the European 
Commission and/or penalty procedures by the European Court of Justice) (Radaelli, 2002). 
Within this context domestic factors are important to the extent that the degree of institutional 
compatibility and interest network constellations determine the degree of compliance. 
Consequently, in defining their respective models Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) focus on the 
importance of “command and control” enforcement mechanisms and the coercive nature of the 
regulatory constraints (“positive mode” of “governance by hierarchy”), while Bauer et al. (2007) 
emphasize the existence of concrete supranational models and their imposition through domestic 
compliance measures (“governance by compliance”). 
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There is a substantially different logic at work behind regulatory patterns aiming to remove 
constraints that distort the market, described as “governance by competition”. At the heart of this 
governance mechanism is an “emerging pattern of regulatory competition” in the European 
Union, where increasing economic interdependence has launched a “race-to-the-bottom” in 
regulatory standards, characterized by member states’ efforts to remove national barriers in line 
with community requirements (Bauer et al., 2007). Instead of prescribing concrete models 
European-level regulation is thus targeted towards abolishing certain categories of regulatory 
obstacles to trade, investment or economic mobility through imposing and effecting clear 
“market-making” rules (“negative integration”) (Radaelli,  2002). Therefore, governance in this 
case functions through altering “the rules of the game” within national policy contexts, leading to 
changing domestic opportunity structures and eventually challenging the established power 
balances among domestic-level actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). As a consequence, rather than 
affecting particular domestic institutional arrangements policy outcomes have a pronounced 
influence on the contextual settings in which such arrangements operate (“second order changes”, 
Hall, 1993). In this instance the scale and magnitude of expected policy changes depends on how 
domestic actors internalize the balance of constraints and opportunities coming from the 
European Union. Therefore, there is a visible bottom-up dimension in regulatory competition.  
An important aspect of “governance by competition” concerns the degree of potential changes at 
the domestic level. Bauer et al. hypothesize that the potential for substantial institutional change 
is higher in policy areas where the dominant mode of governance is regulatory competition. On 
the one hand, national administrations are less inclined to preserve existing structures as such 
“institutional reflexes” might impede their relevant competitive advantages in comparison to 
those of other participants on the common market (Bauer et al., 2007, p.411). On the other hand, 
the impacts of regulatory competition in terms of differential empowerment of domestic 
economic and social actors increases the chance that those actors will seek to intervene and 
impose their preferences to secure any envisaged gains, hinting at the high public and political 
salience of potential policy outcomes (Ibid, p.412).  
A further discussion of the “competition” mode of governance takes into account the direction of 
domestic changes. As observed by Knill and Lehmkuhl while tilting the existing domestic 
balances through introducing new opportunities the EU does not ascribe any particular 
parameters to the resulting new equilibria (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, p.258). In the absence of 
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compensatory mechanisms the outcome of alterations in opportunity structures might increase the 
existing asymmetries between advantaged and disadvantaged actors within national policy 
environments, influencing in turn the level of compliance and the degree of regulatory reform in 
general. Therefore, in contrast to the “compliance” governance mode, in “competition” the 
potential for policy change is determined by the specific structural characteristics of the 
incumbent policy settings at the domestic level. This point is supported empirically through the 
study of Héritier and Knill (2000) on policy change in telecommunications across five EU 
member states (Germany, Italy, Britain, Netherlands and France). The authors come to the 
conclusion that genuine policy change is most likely to occur in fragmented policy contexts 
where power and resources are distributed evenly among actor networks, as competition for 
benefits stemming from the new opportunities might tip the scales in the direction of regulatory 
change. On the contrary, if domestic actor constellations are characterized by uneven distribution 
of power skewed towards the dominant position of a particular actor (individual or network) 
policy change is unlikely to take place, unless this actor is a proponent of the regulatory reform 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, Adam and Kriesi, 2007). It is logical to assume, therefore, that in 
such domestic settings European inputs might entrench, rather than even the existing winner/loser 
disproportions, which in turn might lead to policy deadlocks and sustained inertia, as described 
by Radaelli (2002).  
Mapping the potential effects of European-level regulation on domestic policy environments, 
characterized by asymmetric power relationships demands a closer look at the existing 
conceptualizations of state capture and policy equilibriums. Those conform to the notion of 
regulatory capture, developed in the work of several early proponents of economic regulation 
theories, most notably members of the so-called Chicago School (Stigler, 1971, Posner, 1974, 
Peltzman, 1976). Building his theoretical model on Olson’s logic of collective action (Olson, 
1971) Stigler argues that economic regulation is targeted and captured by effective interest 
groups, who are willing to maximize their profits through harnessing the power of the state to 
redistribute wealth. The potential of interests to benefit from regulation is a function of their size 
and internal homogeneity: small, cohesive groups (big producers) have a stronger incentive to 
mobilize as the benefits of extracting gains outweigh the costs of exerting political influence; on 
the contrary, it is more difficult for large and fragmented interests (small firms, consumers) to 
efficiently overcome the cost barrier associated with regulatory capture, as their benefits from 
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mobilization are smaller (Stigler, 1971). A major concern with Stigler’s model is the exceptional 
focus on the demand side of regulation, while the rationale behind regulators’ decisions to grant 
access to particular actors is largely neglected.  
Consequently, the model of regulatory capture has been updated by Peltzman who attempts to 
build a broader theoretical framework, incorporating both supply and demand factors. According 
to Peltzman as regulators strive to maximize political support from different constituencies they 
are inclined to balance between the demands of competing interest groups when distributing 
wealth (Peltzman, 1976). The risk of regulatory capture is higher when the gains of receiving 
support from large industry players outweigh the cost of losing the support of consumers. 
However, the latter rise with the potential of consumers to mobilize and withdraw their support if 
regulatory decisions “veer too far in one direction” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, p.10). As a 
result, a regulatory equilibrium is reached when support is evenly distributed among competing 
interest groups.  
Peltzman’s model is relevant to studying how the relationship between “clientele characteristics 
and bureaucratic resource allocation” produces winners and losers in economic regulation 
(Bendor and Moe, 1985, p.756). However, it also suffers from visible deficiencies: “regulators” 
are positioned as an abstract category, identifying institutional decision-making authority with the 
activity of a single compound entity that disregards the distinctions and interactions between 
regulative agencies and legislators, as well as between politicians and bureaucrats. Interest groups 
are also stipulated as a binary category of producers and consumers, while important actors, such 
as environmental activists, are omitted from the model. It also does not explain the conditions 
under which stabilization occurs when regulatory provision strays too far away from the social 
optimum.  
The first two issues are addressed by Bendor and Moe who theorize a dynamic “triangle” model 
which maps the flow of influences between legislatures, agencies and interest groups, while 
assuming a simple process of bureaucratic response to actor inputs: decision-makers adapt to the 
interests providing greatest utility maximization, without making efforts to optimize the system 
(Bendor and Moe, 1985, p.757-758). In this regard, later conceptualization attempts in the field of 
state capture elaborate considerably on the interaction patterns between public actors and private 
interests, extending the scope of the notion well beyond the classic “iron triangles” (as defined in 
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Weingast, 1981). For example, Hellman and Schankerman distinguish between two types of 
linkage running in two directions – from the state to the companies (“the grabbing hand”) and 
from enterprises to state officials (extraction of state resources) (Hellman and Schankerman, 
2000, p.548). Incorporating the two dimensions, Grzymala-Busse defines ruling elites of 
“individuals, oligarchies, factions, or parties”, tapping in the legal enforcement and regulatory 
functions of the state in order to extract private gains and lower the costs of exit (Grzymala-
Busse, 2008, p.640). As to the modes of exchange between demand and supply, Kitschelt outlines 
various forms of clientelistic effort, ranging from outright gifts to preferential access to public 
procurements and selective application of regulatory rules, finding positive correlation in the 
latter two cases (Kitschelt, 2011a). 
Baumgartner et al. address the issue of stabilization in existing policy equilibriums by focusing 
on the effects of actor-specific factors (True, Jones and Baumgartner, 2007, Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2002). The authors distinguish between two major mechanisms of policy change, defined 
as “negative” and “positive” feedback. In negative feedback systems homeostatic forces maintain 
stability by counter-balancing external pressures. Thus, the excessive concentration of demand in 
a particular segment of the system activates self-correcting mechanisms that “reigns it back in”. 
In public policy negative feedback mechanisms translate into challenges to entrenched policy 
subsystems (“policy monopolies”) (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, p.9-15). Depending on the 
level of capsulation of the incumbent subsystems and the timeliness of corrective action, 
disproportioned equilibriums either result in new equilibrium outcomes (that might “differ from 
the general good”) or eventual “disturbances”, caused by the mobilization of rival interests. On 
the contrary, positive feedback mechanisms work through reinforcing, rather than 
counterbalancing emerging trends. Here, transfer of information between actors, mimicking, 
desire to conform to the behavior of others, as well as shifting political agendas might trigger 
policy change. When a previously overlooked issue enters the macro-political arena, or more 
attributes of an issue become politically salient little changes in objective circumstances might 
cause substantial changes in policy processes. Alternation in periods of stasis and 
“disequilibrium” is defined as “punctured equilibrium” (True et al., 2002).  
Applied to specific policy areas the above considerations pose particular implications in terms of 
the domestic impacts of “governance by competition”. Berry points out that the potential for 
“capture” by prospective beneficiaries is higher in regulatory areas, where benefits are highly 
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concentrated and costs are widely distributed, in contrast to areas where either benefits are more 
evenly distributed or costs are more concentrated, allowing for greater public scrutiny (Berry, 
1984). Regulation of utilities and electricity in particular, is an example of the former. It is also 
prone to entrenched “policy subsystems”, stemming from its long history of established natural 
monopolies, exempt from competition rules and heavily guarded by national governments 
(Padgett, 1992). In addition, many of the core reforms envisaged in the sector, such as separation 
of generation and transmission activities, have been targeted towards reducing the anti-
competitive behavior of incumbent companies and ensuring non-discriminated access to third 
parties, significantly reducing the benefits of rent-seeking behavior and implying a negative 
feedback dynamic (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). In this regard Eising and Jabko conceptualize the 
existence of a dual-institutional context in the electricity sector, where the push towards 
liberalization reform at the EU level can be eclipsed by the inertia of existing institutional 
structures at the domestic level (Eising and Jabko, 2001, p.748). Empirical observations in two 
policy implementation contexts (Germany and France) have confirmed that the mobilization of 
pro-reform forces does not represent a sufficient factor of change if domestic institutional 
arrangements are too entrenched: only after national perceptions were altered through 
involvement in EU negotiations, extensive campaigning and attention shifting (positive feedback 
tactics) proponents of reform were able to gain leverage against incumbent “policy monopolies” 
(Ibid). To a certain extent Lodge conform to this view, but the authors’ own empirical study on 
four countries (Britain, Ireland, Germany, Sweden) and two regulatory areas 
(telecommunications, electricity) reveals a more balanced picture of Europeanization influences 
across national policy arenas. The author concludes that while Europeanization provided an 
important focal point for discussing crucial features of domestic regulatory policies, at least in 
one case (Germany) domestic response translated into resistance to policy change that threatened 
the privileged position of established structures (Lodge, 2002). 
Finally, the specific context of Central and Eastern Europe should be taken into account when 
discussing the potential of regulatory competition to trigger domestic change. Two factors are of 
particular relevance: the considerable market for state capture in the region and the lack of proper 
self-correcting mechanisms that can stabilize the system in cases of skewed equilibria. Shleifer 
argues in this respect that regulation is a good option only in societies, where rent-seeking 
behavior by public or private actors can be controlled through relevant checks and balances. 
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States characterized by powerful executives and lack of democratic restraints are particularly 
susceptible to capture, as politicization can increase the risk of regulators applying the law 
selectively among their enemies and rule-violators (Shleifer, 2005, p.446-447). Mirroring those 
observations is a seminal empirical work by Hellman, measuring state capture in post-communist 
economies (Hellman, 1998). The author concludes that the pace of reform in newly formed 
democracies in the CEE region has been determined not by the short-term losers of economic 
transition (as officially accepted, see), but rather dominated by the net winners. The latter have 
thwarted macroeconomic stabilization in order to preserve their profits stemming from prolonged 
market distortions. In other words, while short-term winners have allowed some form of quasi-
reforms they have also subverted more thoroughgoing efforts in order to cement their advantages, 
forming a ‘partial reform equilibrium’. Thus, advances in market liberalization and privatizations 
have not been accompanied by relevant institutional and legal reforms, as necessary limits to 
rent-seeing behaviors. A later study led by the same author divides former socialist states in high 
and low capture countries, arguing that in cases of thriving capture markets firms obtain more 
gains by “skewing the basic rules of the game”, while in more constrained capture markets firms 
benefit the most from procurement kickbacks (Hellman et al., 2000, p.15). Moreover, once states 
reach a certain capture threshold “a self-reinforcing dynamic is generated that propels state 
capture to even higher levels” (Ibid, p.7). Building on Hellman’s conclusions Hollyer 
substantiates a hypothesis, according to which European Union conditionality during the 
accession process of CEE countries might have created crucial conditions for long-term 
alterations in the regions’ state capture levels. The author observes that existing entrenched elites 
are vulnerable to external pressures as their power to influence the state diminished rapidly if new 
entrants are allowed to enter the market. New entrants themselves are more inclined to follow 
substantial liberalization efforts, thus further driving the reform thrust (Hollyer, 2010).  
In conclusion, there are three observations to be made in regard to the above literature review. 
First, a great deal of the existing Europeanization literature focuses on the application of either 
“top-down” or “bottom-up” approaches, with little attention paid to the specific governance 
mechanisms at work in different policy areas. Second, empirical studies on cases, where 
Europeanization works through changing domestic opportunity structures (regulatory 
competition), are scarce or concentrate mostly on EU15. Third, the question of how community 
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regulatory regimes affect domestic policy environments, characterized by skewed regulatory 
equilibriums, has not been covered sufficiently in the existing literature.  
2. Research design 
2.1. Concept formation. Policy inputs, outputs and domestic contexts 
The ideational premises of the research step on the following progression of conceptual 
propositions. At a basic level, the targeted policy issue (electricity liberalization) falls within a 
sector of utility regulation, governed by regulatory competition (as defined by Bauer et al., 2007). 
Consequently, European inputs operate not by means of convergence-inducing mechanisms, such 
as institutional misfits and prescribing particular outcomes, but rather through pushing towards 
domestic rule re-adjustment in line with certain standards of market behavior (i.e. de-
monopolization and removal of competitive distortions) (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). As a result 
thereof, domestic adaptation to such inputs can either induce shifts in the institutional settings of 
EU member states (changing opportunity structures), resulting in absorption of rules, or lead to 
sustained domestic inertia, depending on context-specific mediating factors (Radaelli, 2002, 
p.116-117). In this regard, understanding divergent policy outcomes across national policy 
environments in the area of electricity liberalization demands looking at how and if the results of 
adaptation to European inputs are reflected in the outcomes.  
The underlying logic of the research thus speculates a pattern of causation, according to which 
national decisions to comply with community liberalization requirements are posed as the 
product of domestic reactions to external inputs: regulatory compliance and pursued market 
liberalization correlate with policy change, while failure to comply implies either entrenchment 
or prolonged inertia.  
Consequently, the research outline incorporates three distinctive components. In the scope of the 
current work policy outcomes are conceptualized as the results of a continuous process of 
adaptation to formally negotiated EU-imposed “market-making” rules leading to eventual 
incorporation in national legal orders. The accent here is on the willingness and capacity of the 
EU member-states to comply by transposing regulatory standards rather than on the ‘final’ 
implementation of already established rules through practical measures and administrative 
procedures (Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998).  
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The second component concerns European inputs, perceived as external perturbations, affecting 
the domestic policy landscapes of the target EU member-states by altering the underlying patterns 
of resource distribution, shifting policy agendas or “opening and closing venues” in policy 
subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The impacts of their adoption by domestic actors 
may either match the intended effects of external requirements or veer away from prescribed rule 
content.   
With respect to the third component, defined as domestic policy contexts, what bears significant 
importance to the analysis is their relevance as loci of dynamic interplay between actors and 
institutional arrangements. The specific features of the latter condition the empirical linkage 
between particular outcomes of rule transpositions and the impacts of EU regulatory regimes. 
Moreover, an emphasis is put on the historically embedded characteristics shaping the pre-
emptive balance of power within domestic policy settings, as changes in utility regulation aim at 
changing the “rules of the game” (second-order change), rather than targeting directly system-
wide institutional and/or organizational configurations (first-order change) (Hall, 1993).  
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2.2. Research paradigms and methodological aspects 
In line with the logic and the key components of the proposed conceptual model the 
research framework takes into account two key methodological perspectives. First, the envisaged 
analysis starts from concrete outcomes in particular cases of domestic adaptation to regulatory 
requirements (compliance success/failure in Czech Republic/Bulgaria) as dependent variables 
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and intends to build a comprehensive explanation around the identified causes. Therefore, it is a 
“causes-of-effects” study (as opposed to “effects-of-causes” attempts), implying a deeper 
understanding of the impact of particular intervening variables (see below) in a restricted sample 
of cases (sectoral policy contexts in two EU member states) (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). In 
addition, the emphasis of the research is on multi-variance, since the intention is to explain the 
connection between disparate effects and the varying parameters of interacting domestic factors 
(Mahoney, 1999).  
Employing the above tactic facilitates the establishment of causal relationships between divergent 
outcomes and potential causes in comparable domestic policy environments. However, it is not 
convincingly positioned to confirm the hypothesized causal link between observed domestic 
changes (or lack thereof) and EU-level influences. Hence, the research calls for a complementary 
strategy as a means for assessing member-states’ policy choices in light of historically situated 
interchanges between European and national policy dimensions (temporal perspective) 
(Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009). The goal is to trace the relation between EU inputs and 
domestic systemic features in a backward direction from an initial state of domestic arrangements 
in the two cases to successive critical historical junctures (“backward mapping”, Elmore, 1979, 
Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009). In this regard, the series of events in domestic electricity sectors 
will be sequenced according to a timeframe, taking as a starting point the pre-accession period of 
economic transition in the two selected cases and moving on to the incorporation of the 
requirements of the three consecutive energy packages of the European  Union. 
An important methodological aspect that needs to be clarified before proceeding to explanatory 
variables is whether the utilized research outline represents a top-down or a bottom-up approach 
according to the distinction made by Radaelli (2004). The most comprehensive response would 
be that the design of the research incorporates both top-down and bottom-up dimensions, with a 
marked prevalence of the latter. On the one hand, European inputs are taken into account as a 
source of constraints and opportunities with direct impact on domestic policy choices, albeit in 
the absence of the top-down pressure mechanisms, associated with institutional inconsistencies. 
On the other, the emphasis of the work is clearly on the domestic level, where observed changes 
are explained as a consequence of the interaction between specific settings and EU inputs, 
implying a visible bottom-up perspective. 
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2.3. Domestic factors and operationalization  
A first step towards tracking down the reasons for (non-)compliance with EU regulatory 
requirements is to capture the state of policy developments within the specific sector of interest 
(electricity) in relation to the policy issue at hand (liberalization) in the two selected country 
cases (Bulgaria and Czech Republic). Thus, the research will commence by mapping this state 
against a set of indicators, determining the degree of liberalization at a specific point in time. 
Drawing from Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) there could be identified three key inter-related 
implementation steps in this respect: 1) sector restructuring (ensuring a suitable market structure 
through unbundling vertically integrated activities and tackling horizontal concentration); 2) 
introducing competition in wholesale and retail supply markets and 3) effective regulation (third-
party access /TPA/ and incentives to transmission and distribution networks) (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2005, p.12-16). Within this three-step assessment frame a low degree of liberalization can be 
conceptualized as the combination of modest restructuring progress, persistent barriers to new 
entry and the lack of a competent controlling mechanism (independent regulator) able to tackle 
TPA and horizontal concentration. Alternatively, completed vertical unbundling, high levels of 
competition and effective independent regulators would indicate a high degree of liberalization. 
In terms of causal patterns inconsistent liberalization translates into a low level of congruence 
with EU liberalizing demands, generating both considerable challenges in terms of rule 
transposition and a wider scope of opportunities to domestic actors, as more is at stake. In the 
opposite case the high level of congruence tones down both challenges and opportunities 
(Héritier and Knill, 2000). 
With respect to domestic actors, as “governance by competition” (Bauer et al., 2007) is 
specifically intended towards re-shuffling the existing rules of market behavior, the patterns of 
incumbent actor constellations and the institutional features of preeminent modes of interaction 
become essential for understanding the impact of community requirements. A common macro-
analytical approach in Europeanization studies ascribes an important role to the number of formal 
and factual veto positions, constraining the institutional capacity of EU member states to generate 
policy change (Börzel and Risse, 2003, Radaelli, 2002, Haverland, 2000). Many formal veto 
points are usually found in policy contexts, characterized by decentralized political systems and 
multi-party coalition governments (Héritier and Knill, 2000). In contrast, factual veto positions 
abound in systems where corporatist traditions, strong socio-economic interests or clientelistic 
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relationships have particular influence on policy-making (Lehmkuhl, 2002). The power of veto 
points can be reined in by a strongly integrated political leadership and a consensual style of 
decision-making, capable of accommodating and reconciling the divergent interests (Héritier and 
Knill, 2000, p.2-3). Thus, change is less likely to occur in policy arenas where decisions need to 
overcome multiple conflicting positions in the absence of politically integrated leadership, while 
fewer veto points and a consensual leadership facilitate adaptation progress (Ibid.).  
Identifying the macro-level characteristics of domestic policy contexts has certain practical 
implications as a diagnostic tool in the initial stages of the analysis. However, the comparative 
component of the current study demands a closer look at how power is distributed among the 
different actors populating a policy context. As a starting point the “advocacy coalition” 
framework, developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith provides an opportunity to configure actor 
constellations as aggregates of dynamically interacting units, or advocacy coalitions, constrained 
in their actions by the structural attributes of the policy context (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). Within this framework mature policy subsystems are defined by the existence of stable 
“semi-autonomous“ communities, incorporating participants with significant expertise and 
extended record of exerting influence in a policy area (Ibid.135-136). What is of interest to the 
current study is the emphasis of the advocacy coalition approach on the stability of the existing 
communities over time and the importance of external factors as triggers of policy change: the 
existing policy equilibria is challenged by changes in the dynamic factors, affecting the policy 
environment, including policy decisions from other subsystems (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, 
p.193). Therefore, increasing adaptation pressures stemming from changes in the community-
level regulatory regime on competition rules can be perceived as a dynamic external factor, 
challenging the established domestic policy communities in the area of electricity liberalization.   
A second step in the analysis of actor dynamics is to look at the established power structure 
within a policy area. Here the application of network analytical approaches (Rhodes and Marsh 
1992, Adam and Kriesi, 2007) could yield considerable benefits as they shed more light over the 
dispersal of influence capabilities over the set of actors, operating in a specific policy domain. 
Consistent with such theoretical efforts is the basic assumption that network participants do not 
posses equal power to influence the policy-making process (Kriesi and Jegen, 2001). As a 
consequence, interaction among actors approximates a competitive game for influence, which can 
result in significant concentration of power in a dominant coalition, as opposed to a fragmented 
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landscape of equally empowered policy actors (concentration vs. fragmentation argument, as 
observed in Europeanization literature, see Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, p.260-261). 
The existence of a dominant coalition parallels a “policy monopoly” (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993, p.7), indicating a political equilibrium “tipped” towards a powerful interest group, which is 
usually less amenable to substantial change. Moreover, considering the fact that structurally a 
dominant coalition can incorporate various actor types (both state and non-state) (Adam and 
Kriesi, 2007, p. 134) it also closely resembles informal “policy communities” that could be found 
in national electricity sectors, including powerful industry companies, legislators, regulatory 
authorities, professional organizations and individual experts. A major insight derived from the 
above considerations postulates policy change in response to European liberalization 
requirements as causally linked to the existing power balances within domestic policy contexts: if 
existing veto positions are concentrated within a dominant coalition of actors with power to block 
policy decisions change is highly unlikely.  
The level of state capture in electricity sectors has a critical role in this respect as an indicator, 
measuring the potential for policy monopolization within domestic policy contexts. As by 
definition state capture increases the profit of small consolidated interest groups, thriving on 
sustained privileged positions in resource distribution, it matches the profile of natural 
monopolies in the utilities sector (Stigler, 1971). Moreover, as the profits of such vested interests 
are usually protected by barriers to competition, they are incentivized to increase their influence 
over regulatory authorities, being highly susceptible to diminishing returns in case the existing 
restrictive practices are challenged (Hollyer, 2010). Removing competitive disadvantages (nee 
liberalization) in this regard is a way to balance the existing asymmetries between winners and 
losers within the policy process. Inasmuch as increasing openness is a prerequisite for change, 
however, it does not translate directly into a level playing field. In the short term it may actually 
retrench the dominant position of an actor coalition by introducing new opportunities for 
extraction (Hellman, 2000), where only the format of rent-seeking behavior is modified (from 
monopolies to “patronage” networks, glued together by clientelistic public-private relationships). 
However, introducing democratic oversight has been identified as a factor, decreasing the level of 
state capture over time (Young, 2011). In addition, competitive resource allocation improves its 
efficiency as rent-seeking actors are willing to “insulate state institutions from political 
influence” if faced with a growing probability of exit from office and respectful punishment in 
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case their illicit activities are revealed (Grzymala-Busse, 2008, p.651). Therefore, in the scope of 
the current work the level of policy monopolization will be indicated as high in policy contexts, 
determined by high levels of state capture, low democratic accountability and inefficient 
oversight mechanisms (i.e. judiciaries, civil control, regulatory authorities, state competition 
commissions etc.). On the contrary, policy monopolization is found to be low in policy 
environments where state capture practices are effectively restrained by oversight institutions. 
The number and type of veto players, specific institutional features and the shape of the existing 
power balances are indispensable domain-specific situational variables that determine the 
potential for policy change within the policy sector of electricity liberalization. However, those 
are necessary, but not sufficient factors within the scope of the current framework (Ragin, 1987, 
p.99). In order to satisfy the condition for dynamism the research also needs to examine the 
means through which the existing reform potential is materialized into concrete policy choices. 
Taking into consideration the distinct actor-centered direction of the work, studying policy 
change becomes a matter of exploring how the interaction between EU inputs and domestic 
policy preferences translates into particular patterns of actor behavior.  
In this context, a separate analytical angle introduces policy salience as a factor conditioning the 
absorption of external policy influences into existing preference structures at the domestic level. 
Within the present outline policy salience can be conceptualized as the extent to which 
liberalization appears as a contested issue within the domestic policy contexts of the selected 
country cases. The existing academic literature distinguishes between “high” and “low” salience 
of policy issues but provides few measurement tools to validate the use of these categories. In this 
respect, three important indicators are identified in Cortell and Davis (2000) as relevant to 
measuring the degree of policy salience – whether the policy issue has entered the domestic 
political discourse, whether it has led to the formation of organized societal groupings in support 
of policy change and whether it has produced a concrete policy agenda.  
In regard to the first indicator the work uses the definition of discourse as an “interactive 
process”, introduced by Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, p.195) in relation to the influence of 
particular groups on policy construction. The second indicator is interpreted as the degree of fit 
between policy content and the interests (in terms of material resources, beliefs and policy 
priorities) of domestic actors: a stronger fit indicates a higher degree of salience (Cortell and 
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Davis, 2000, p.77). A policy agenda is present where specific government working groups have 
been set up to device policy choices in response to external prescriptions (Ibid, p.70). 
Consequently, salience is low in cases where liberalization has entered the domestic discourse but 
has failed to incentivize group formation or a particular agenda. On the contrary, high salience is 
identified with high public resonance of liberalization, the existence of competing interest groups 
and the obligation of state actors to defend their positions against both such groups and the 
general public (Adam and Kriesi, 2007, p.142).  




Level of electricity 
market 
liberalization 
 Separation of transmission from generation and supply /vertical 
unbundling/ 
 Competition in wholesale market 
 Independent and efficient regulatory authority 
 
Reform capacity 
 Number and type of veto points 
 Pattern of power distribution across actor populations 
 State capture potential 
 Presence of efficient democratic constraints 
 
Level of salience 
 Presence of liberalization in domestic political discourse 
 Degree of fit between policy content and actor preferences/ 
Forming actor coalitions 
 Presence of defined policy agenda 
 
2.4. Data gathering  
Within the scope of the current work studying variation in domestic responses to EU 
inputs will be realized through comprehensive contextualization of a number of hypothesized 
causes of policy change. Therefore, the research design of the work seeks to build relatively 
 
36 
exhaustive profiles of the domestic policy contexts of two selected EU member-states by 
incorporating a synthesis of institutional and actor-centered analytical perspectives. 
Consequently, it draws on data derived from both qualitative and quantitative primary and 
secondary sources. 
The degree of liberalization within national electricity sectors will be identified on the basis of a 
brief analysis of relevant national-level legislation (primary and secondary law), strategic 
documents (state energy policy concepts and plans of action) and historical accounts of 
developments in the sector (official reports and author studies).  
Levels of state capture and clientelism will be measured both quantitatively (through formalized 
measurement indices, such as the EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey /BEEPS 1999-2009/ (as analyzed in Hellman et al., 2000), plus data, collected within the 
remit of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project, implemented by Duke University) 
(as analyzed in Kitschelt, 2011a), as well as qualitatively (policy opinions, think-tank reports, 
analyses and interviews, found in domestic media).  
A similar method will be used to measure democratic consolidation within the selected cases: two 
primary sources will provide quantitative data (the Nations In Transit survey, developed by 
Freedom House, together with the Transformation Index BTI for East-Central and Southeast 
Europe /2008-2012/ of Bertelsmann Stiftung), while the efficiency of oversight institutions 
within the energy sectors will be measured against a checklist, developed by EBRD. 
Policy salience will be determined through a brief monitoring of domestic media at major 
junctures of policy progress, as well as 3 semi-structured interviews (2 in Bulgaria and 1 in the 
Czech Republic) with experts and professionals in the area of energy markets. 
 
2.5. Building causal relationships 
There are two basic causal mechanisms identified in the scope of the present research 
design. Their elaboration steps on an understanding of compliance decisions as the product of 
domestic calculations over the burdens and benefits of EU-level requirements. Here, the interplay 
of national factors and external influences reflects on the interests and positions of the actors, 
included in a policy domain. 
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In policy contexts where EU inputs are perceived as a constraint – namely those characterized by 
a skewed balance of power between a dominant actor/advocacy coalition and a host of 
fragmented “outsider” players, marked propensity for regulatory capture and fewer democratic 
constraints - European liberalization prescriptions are unlikely to result in timely or conclusive 
rule transposition. On the one hand, a policy monopoly can effectively block substantial rule 
readjustment for a long time by activating correcting mechanisms intended to keep the system in 
stasis. On the other hand, it is assumed that intensifying regulatory demands would be resisted by 
equally rigorous countervailing trends where powerful actor formations “guard” the entrance to 
the system in order to preserve steady outcomes (negative feedback mechanism, Baumgartner 
and Jones, 2002). This is particularly relevant to the policy issue of electricity liberalization, 
where external requirements are targeted explicitly towards eliminating the source of profit, that 
existing monopolies strive to protect.  
Consequently, the more asymmetric power relations are in a policy subsystem the more 
European-level inputs are expected to increase, rather than decrease the existing asymmetries. 
Here, public salience is assumed to be at a low level as wider debate on liberalization is 
precluded by the absence of strong competing interest groups. The result is a self-invigorating 
‘vicious’ circle that could be illustrated in the following way: 
EU demands challenge existing policy monopolies => resistance and entrenchment/inertia => no 
policy change => no compliance with EU norms => no reform=> policy monopolies continue to 
thrive=>mounting external pressure 
Eventually, maintaining the existing market distortions becomes unsustainable in light of 
diminishing returns to incumbent monopolists and/or the increasing risk of societal mobilization 
(Radaelli, 2002, p.116). However, in the short term lack of change may strengthen the dominant 
position of vested interests, increasing the gap between European prescriptions and domestic 
practices and allowing the incumbents to occupy the created vacuum.  
Though important, it may not be entirely efficient to determine the outcomes of regulatory 
adaptation in a linear way through the existence of policy monopolies, enduring restrictions on 
participation or lack of democratic accountability. Such an approach neglects the potential of EU-
level inputs to generate policy change or precipitate ongoing development by empowering the 
actors outside the status quo.  
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As noted above, the veto power of entrenched interests can be subverted by transforming 
opportunity structures (i.e. the number of coalition partners or access points in decision-making 
settings) (Héritier and Knill, 2000, p.2). The efforts of new competitors to enter the policy 
domain of electricity regulation, by using external inputs as a source of political leverage, may 
alter the structural attributes shaping the process of rule transposition (Ibid.). Here increasing 
policy salience plays a crucial role as a high degree of congruence between the rule content and 
the interests of newly formed groupings (new market entrants, consumers) may bring new aspects 
into the policy debate, prompting shifts in existing decision-making agendas towards compliance 
(positive feedback, Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). Moreover, changes caused by exogenous 
inputs are supposed to have more public repercussions in domestic policy contexts where 
interaction patterns between actors are based on more symmetric power distributions. As a 
consequence, incumbent networks may decide to go along with rule transposition if they perceive 
community-level regulation as a new source of profits that must be shared with other market 
actors rather than as a threat to existing privileges.   
It is up to the current work to investigate whether in the negative case of rule transposition 
(Bulgaria) lack of compliance to community regulatory requirements is the result of weak 
empowerment of potential new entrants, lack of policy salience or the enduring dominance of an 
entrenched policy monopoly. In the positive case (Czech Republic) it is to be seen whether the 
success of rule transposition was due to a more balanced spectrum of power relations, strong 
differential empowerment or a perception of EU imposed rules as a tool for benefit maximization 
within the incumbent actor coalition. 
 
2.6. Case selection 
The current research framework strives to compare domestic policy contexts in member 
states of the European Union. For the purposes of the envisaged comparative analysis the single 
unit of “policy context” is interpreted as a bounded environment incorporating three distinctive 
structural components: 1) actor populations, consisting of competing actors, varying in number 
(pro-reform or veto players) (Börzel and Risse, 2003) and type (state, political parties, interest 
groups and non-governmental organizations) (Adam and Kriesi, 2007), characterized by a 
specific mode of interaction (advocacy coalitions, networks) (Ibid) and balance of power 
(concentration or fragmentation) (Héritier and Knill, 2001), resulting in a distinctive policy 
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equilibrium (balanced or asymmetric) (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993); 2) national institutional 
settings, consisting of patterns of policy-making, determined by system-wide attributes, such as 
political rules of conduct (consensual, competitive or conflictual) (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2006), 
modes of public-private interaction (statist, pluralist or corporatist) (Falkner, 1999) and 
democratic accountability mechanisms (independent courts, oversight institutions); 3) public 
resonance of electricity liberalization, reflecting a higher level of actor cognitive capacity to 
assess the pros and cons of EU inputs as a basis for pro-active positioning on policy choices.    
The selection of specific country cases is realized on the basis of a “most similar systems design” 
matching technique, corresponding to Mill’s method of difference (Landman, 2003). On the one 
hand, the choice of this strategy is dictated by the need to observe the “behavior” of a particular 
set of explanatory variables within contexts similar enough to allow the exclusion of irrelevant 
country-specific characteristics. On the other hand, the work intends to study how parallel 
processes of change take place within each context as a way to highlight the underlying 
differences (Collier, 1993, p.108). Therefore, the emphasis of the research is not on conducting a 
systematic in-depth causal analysis across cases, but rather on using the juxtaposition of contexts 
to explain differing outcomes through a series of theoretically driven causal factors. 
Two cases are identified as particularly relevant to the aims of this research design – domestic 
policy contexts in Bulgaria and Czech Republic. Two factors inform this selection. First, the 
research seeks to identify regulatory compliance at the national level in EU member states with 
the existence of a dominant advocacy coalition, seen as a major stumbling block to adaptation 
progress. The two selected cases incorporate specific contextual circumstances that make them 
particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture and clientelism, associated with incumbent 
monopolies in post-communist economies. Among those is the legacy of highly centralized 
industry and quasi-market reforms in the transition period, which allowed a small clique of 
company owners to thrive on existing market distortions (Hellman, 1998). Another factor is the 
lack of developed counterbalancing mechanisms in the form of institutional constraints (e.g. 
strong administrative organs, independent judiciaries etc.) to predatory private interests, not least 
because of few incentives for captors to push for liberal reforms (Sonin, 2002). Although some 
authors argue that EU accession conditionality has reduced considerably the levels of state 
capture in CEE states through accelerating democratic consolidation (Hollyer, 2010, Young, 
2011), it is logical to assume that in countries identified as high capture economies (Hellman and 
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Schankerman, 2000) the proliferation of clientelist network remains highly susceptible to 
democratic reforms and the quality of restraining mechanisms.  
Second, the case selection allows for keeping constant characteristics that do not fit the 
established causations between domestic power distribution and policy outcomes. One such 
factor underlines the nature of governance structures in the two cases (Lijphart, 1999). As both 
countries are unitary states with high concentration of policy competencies within national 
administrations, the potential of decentralized governments to generate veto points is kept under 
control. Also, a factor that is controlled for is the pro-EU orientation of national political elites. 
Here, Linos hypothesizes that in EU member states with pro-Europe governments rule 
transposition is more likely to be completed within the prescribed deadlines (Linos, 2007, p.552). 
However, as indicated by studies (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002) and expert opinions (Kalan, 
2013) alike the positive case of regulatory compliance (Czech Republic) actually scores higher in 
terms of Eurosceptic party stances within the political establishment than the selected negative 
case (Bulgaria). Consequently, the level of government support to EU integration can be ruled 
out as an explanatory variable. A third factor that is kept constant is the role of political and 
economic power in adaptation to community rules. An underlying assumption is this regard is 
that more powerful states can afford to protract rule transposition as they are less susceptible to 
the reputational and material costs, associated with compliance failure (Börzel et al, 2010). 
However, measured in GDP per capita the state that pursued fully compliance (Czech Republic) 
is politically and economically more influential than the non-compliance case (Bulgaria).  
Finally, resource capacity for managing rule transposition is dismissed as in the policy domain at 
hand EU rules do not require changes in system-wide institutional or administrative 
arrangements.  
 
2.7. Constraints of the research 
A number of constraints are able to compromise the validity of the research. First, as an 
interpretative case study in the sense of Lijphart (1971) it inevitably brings in some of the 
deficiencies associated with small N efforts. By attempting to explain divergent outcomes 
through a limited set of potentially explanatory factors it might neglect important causes with 
significant influence over the outcomes. For example factors, related to domestic political 
cultures or administrative traditions are not specifically addressed in the current framework, 
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although some of their characteristic features are touched upon in the course of the analysis. The 
work strives to compensate for such trade-offs by selecting similar cases, allowing to limit the 
number of potential contrast to a narrow pool of explanations. Furthermore, the 
operationalization of the factors that have been selected is also approached through an 
interpretivist perspective. Therefore, some of the biases, associated with deterministic definitions 
of variable measures cannot be avoided completely. However, the research design tries to keep 
any utilized measurement scales maximally close to standardized uses in qualitative studies and 
official sources. A specific bias arising from the nature of the work as an entry in the ongoing 
Europeanization debate is related to the difficulty in establishing a clear positive association 
between European inputs and developments at the national level. The research will address this 
problem by introducing a temporal dimension to the analysis of domestic contexts as a way to 
determine whether such association can be inferred from policy progress and actor stances at 
critical occasions. 
 
3. Country cases 
The current work takes as a starting point domestic regulatory compliance with the 
standards, laid out in a particular supranational legislative act: Directive 2009/72/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity (Official Journal of the European Union, 
2009). More specifically, the 2009 Electricity Directive has required the vertical separation of 
undertakings in the electricity sector by stipulating three possible types of regulatory solutions to 
be implemented in national legislation by the end of 2011. Those include: a) ownership 
unbundling; b) independent system operator (ISO) and c) independent transmission operator 
(ITO), differing in the degree of vertical separation (from complete unbundling to a possibility to 
retain ownership of the owned electricity grids under increased outside supervision). The 
introduction of the first option entails complete dismantling of existing monopolies, while the 
third virtually leaves the latter intact in the presence of strong constraining mechanisms. 
Moreover, the efficient provision of third party access and protecting the rights of end customers 
in the event of unbundling is to be ensured by increasing the supervisory authority and 
controlling functions of the national regulatory agency, as well as providing adequate sources of 
information to consumers. While being subjected to uniform pressures to introduce one of the 
three stipulated solutions, Czech Republic opted for full ownership unbundling, which it finalized 
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within the prescribed deadline, while to date Bulgaria has not completed a relevant procedure in 
this regard, while the third option has been incorporated in national law. 
3.1. BULGARIA 
3.1.1. Background 
In January 2013 the European Commission referred Bulgaria to the European Court of 
Justice for failure to fully transpose the requirements of the 2009 Directive concerning the 
common rules for the internal market in electricity (RAPID, 2013). Of the three core segments, 
comprising the content of the established regulatory regime – separation of transmission 
networks from generation and supply, ensuring effective regulatory supervision and protecting 
consumer interests – it was insufficient compliance with the first one that provided the formal 
occasion for opening of an infringement procedure. However, taken together those represent a 
complex interwoven set of “market-making” standards – unbundling is necessary to eliminate 
barriers to competition and new entry, regulatory oversight works as a safeguard against 
distortive practices, while non-discriminatory access to the distribution networks determines the 
downstream access of final customers (Directive 2009/72/EC). In this sense, the incorporation of 
such standards in the legal order and regulatory practice of EU member-states has a clearly 
defined purpose: to change the domestic “rules of the game” in the direction of curbing anti-
competitive market behavior of incumbent players as a prerequisite for genuine reform of the 
electricity sector (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). This is consistent with the findings of Knill and 
Lehmkuhl (2001), as reported in the literature review that in those areas where EU governance 
functions through competition the purpose of rule transposition is to exclude certain market 
distorting options from domestic regulatory practices.  Therefore, in the Bulgaria policy context 
the analysis strives to reveal whether and to what extent the factual failure to comply with 
European-level requirements can be attributed to undergoing developments in a direction running 
opposite to reform targets. 
 
3.1.2. Is the Bulgarian electricity market liberalized: the state of reforms? 
A first step towards answering the posed question is to identify the level of liberalization 
within the domestic electricity market in Bulgaria. If legislative changes are taken into account a 
brief examination of the harmonized legal content reveals no obvious discrepancies between 
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European-level demands and national arrangements in Bulgaria. In terms of strategic 
commitments a new policy concept was introduced in 2011 setting priorities for the development 
of the energy sector until 2020. What can be found in the document is much in line with EU 
energy policy provisions. Building an “independent, regulated and competitive energy market” is 
among the key included objectives, where implementation measures envisage ensuring non-
discriminatory access to the existing transmission network, increasing the professional capacity 
and independence of the national regulatory authority, State Energy and Water Regulatory 
Commission /SEWRC/, disclosure of information on the available capacity of the grid and 
protection of consumer rights (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Tourism, 2011). Moreover, 
separation of the transmission operator from generation and supply is included in the mid-term 
priority window with a firm commitment to complete the procedure for unbundling before the 
deadline of December 2011. 
Regulatory arrangements corresponding to the requirements of the electricity Directive were 
introduced a year later in the Bulgarian Energy Law. An “independent transmission operator” – 
the model preferred by the government – was introduced, together with an overhaul of the 
oversight responsibilities of SEWRC and a new chapter on protection of customers, providing a 
wide palette of contractual obligations to be followed by suppliers and supervised by the 
regulatory authority. However, by the time the necessary changes were introduced the Bulgarian 
government was already receiving clear indications by the European Commission about possible 
sanctions for non-compliance (Capital, 2012). Moreover, discussing the legislative amendments 
in Parliament yielded heavy criticisms over the pace of the reform by both members of the 
opposition and representatives of the energy industry. Officials and experts alike expressed their 
doubts over the insufficient political commitment over the practical implementation of the new 
rules, whose “en-block” transposition in national law they saw more as a way to appease EU 
demands, rather than as a concerted reform effort expected to fill the existing gap between legal 
provisions and practical realization (CEPET, 2012a,b). Subsequently, liberalization dropped 
completely from the government regulatory agenda in a situation of intensifying external and 
internal pressure (Capital, 2013), hinting at a sustained inability of the domestic institutional 
framework to identify adequate policy measures. The latter is largely confirmed by expert 
opinions, according to which rather than being the result of technical incapacity the delayed 
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reform process is more likely caused by a pro-longed lack of commitment on the part of decision-
makers to put in practice the already legally incorporated EU rules (Interview CSD, 2013). 
The ambition of decision-makers in the Bulgarian energy sector to create conditions for a 
competitive electricity market through a combination of a new energy strategy ((former) Ministry 
of Energy and Energy Resources, 2002) and a new energy law (National Assembly, 2003) 
parallels a similar sequence of developments in 2002-2003 (Alexandrova, 2003). Then, 
harmonization with the requirements of the 1996 Electricity Directive was in the focus of the 
policy efforts, associated with the pre-accession introduction of the acquis (Europe.bg, Chapter 
14 “Energy”, 2002). The key words in this round of regulation were again largely coinciding with 
external requirements. Creating a functioning market model, provision of direct access to 
generators, phasing-out of price subsidies, balanced pricing, restructuring and setting up an 
independent market operator were in the spotlight of reform aspirations ((former) Ministry of 
Energy and Energy Resources, 2002). However, as in the above example almost no firm 
deadlines were committed to paper (or met). Market opening to retail customers was introduced 
at the last possible moment in 2007, where the prospect of EU membership played a significant 
role in the timing of enforcement measures, with initial considerable skepticism on the part of 
Bulgarian policy-makers (Capital, 2005). 
A wholesale market structure was also devised but as of now apart from large energy consumers 
all other customers (e.g. SMEs and household consumers) do not have access to direct price 
negotiation with generators, being sold electricity at regulated prices from distribution 
companies. Suppliers also buy power from the National electricity company /NEC/, purchased 
from producers under quota obligations, again at regulated prices (EC, 2012a). Therefore, only 
around 30% of electricity prices are freely negotiated. The generation segment of the market is 
characterized by high market concentration, where the producers “bundled” together with NEC in 
a single state-owned company produce around 60% of the total electricity output in the country 
(Ibid). They have no incentive to leave the comfort of the high fixed prices provided by NEC in 
order to compete on the free market (Interview EMI, 2013). Finally, the prices to household 
customers are kept at a very low level that does not fully cover generation costs, indicating on-
going cross-subsidizing practices (Nenova, 2008). 
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In a nutshell, the electricity sector in Bulgaria could be identified by a very high potential for 
competitive distortions, related to the degree of government intervention and the dominant 
market position of NEC, impeding the adoption of a market-based approach, as well as the ability 
of generators and suppliers to choose freely their contracting parties (EC, 2012a). These are all 
indicators, which, according to Joskow define electricity sectors where reform efforts have been 
implemented incompletely or inconsistently, veering away from the “textbook model” of 
“restructuring, regulatory reform and market design” (Joskow, 2008, p.15).  Therefore, in the 
case of Bulgaria the transposition of the third EU energy package was expected to take effect in a 
policy environment, characterized by a low level of liberalization and a wide gap between formal 
legal provisions and actual implementation measures. Also, in this context much of the realized 
policy efforts have been brought by the need to accomplish the externally negotiated reform 
targets, set by the European Union. 
 
3.1.3. Reform capacity 
How to explain the choices made by policy-makers in the described context? At the 
macro level the question that needs to be addressed is to what extent the existence of formal veto 
points can be involved as an explanatory variable in assessing domestic policy responses. On the 
federal/unitary dimension, conceptualized by Lijphart (1987) Bulgaria is firmly residing within 
the majoritarian end of the spectrum, indicated by a unitary governance structure and a high level 
of centralization (Roberts, 2006). Therefore, the ability of local self-government to influence 
policy can be outright excluded from the explanandum. In terms of cabinet types in the period 
when the bulk of liberalization reforms were programmed to take place (2001-2013) decision-
making in the energy sector was in the hands of two consecutive majority governments (a centrist 
single-party and centrist-left coalition) and a stable minority government (center-right), which 
coupled with the relative cabinet durability again approximates a majoritarian pattern within 
Lijpharts’s model. 
In general the Bulgarian political system has become less consolidated in the second decade after 
the start of post-communist transition, reflecting the emergence of new socio-economic cleavage 
structures (Karasimeonov, 2010). However, this trend has not translated into a higher extent of 
government instability due to the specificities of the electoral system (a 4% electoral threshold 
and a closed-list proportional representation) (ibid). In this respect Roberts argues that “electoral 
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systems in Eastern Europe, despite their consensus design, seem to act in a majoritarian manner, 
with large parties receiving a considerable bonus in seat allocation” (Roberts, 2006, p.42). Thus, 
the ability of formal veto points to block policy decisions is arguably less pronounced. 
As to factual veto points, related to the pattern of interest-intermediation and the opportunities of 
non-state actors to influence policy-making, on the surface Bulgaria is defined by a corporatist 
mode of public-private interaction, with established channels of influence (formalized tripartite 
bargaining mechanisms) and well-defined relationships between governmental officials, business 
and labour (State Gazette, 2001). In Lijphart’s model this would indicate a consolidated structure 
of interest group interaction corresponding to fewer veto points. However, several indicators tilt 
against potential re-alignments in the direction of pluralist arrangements. Labour unions have 
been marginalized (the largest union CITUB had a little more than 300 000 members in 2008) 
(EFILWC, 2009), but the domestic business community has undergone processes of 
consolidation (the two most influential business organizations merged in 2006 to form a single 
umbrella, CEIB). In addition, European accession has been a major driver of consensus by 
providing access to new venues (a newly established Economic and Social Council) and 
financing opportunities (Strutural Funds) to both social partners and, more importantly, diffuse 
interests traditionally functioning outside formalized bargaining structures (e.g. 
environmentalists, consumers etc.). Nevertheless, the efficiency of formal input channels has 
been widely questioned (see Ost, 2000), which puts under suspicion the ability of interest groups 
to have a say over particular policy processes. 
A factor that also needs to be considered in relation to veto positions is to what extent the 
influence of informal practices is reflected in policy positions. In this respect the Bulgarian policy 
context can be defined as particularly susceptible to the existence of indirect interaction and 
“contingent exchange” (Kitschelt, 2011b) between political agents and private interests. First, in 
the post-2000 period the political system has entered a “continuous and deepening legitimacy 
crisis”, defined by declining voter turnout and high electoral volatility (Karasimeonov, 2010, 
p.149). This has attenuated the existing social bases of individual political parties and has 
hindered the development of steady popular party identifications. Moreover, the latter were never 
particularly thick in the first place, due to the highly elitist nature of party formation in the post-
communist period (Ibid). Within such an environment, as argued by Kopecký, it is only natural 
for parties to turn to the state for resources, which they cannot obtain through popular 
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mobilization (Kopecký, 2006). In combination with the very low level of transparency in party 
financing (2.66 out of 10, according to Transparency International-Bulgaria) (TI-Bulgaria, 2005) 
this has created considerable rent-seeking possibilities, as well as spreading partisanship within 
state structures. An additional issue is the above mentioned inefficiency of formalized 
mechanisms for interest aggregation and dialogue to create a transparent network of public-
private relationships, forcing interests to lobby largely “outside” the system. Finally, the specific 
pattern of evolving government-business relations in the transition period, related among other 
things to the practice of creating specific business circles as subsidiary structures of particular 
parties (with resounding names, such as “Orion” /early BSP/, “Olimp” /UDF/, “Frontier”/BSP, 
NDSV, MRF/) (Iankova, 2009), hints at a high potential for established clientelist types of 
interaction. As a concluding remark, the question of whether veto points bear relevance to the 
analysis at hand cannot be answered in a unilateral way. At first sight, the veto power of formal 
and factual structures to block decisions appears insignificant due to the strongly majoritarian 
outlook of the political space. On the other hand, there is evidence that factual veto points may be 
effective in influencing the outcome of policy processes through informal channels.   
3.1.4. Power distribution and capture potential in the Bulgarian policy context 
Identifying potential veto points is useful in sketching a general outline of the institutional 
setting, constraining policy choices in the Bulgarian case. However, it is not particularly well 
situated as a tool to grasp the distribution of power among the actors that populate the particular 
context of energy policy within the country. Here, the analysis strives to find out whether both 
veto and pro-reform positions are concentrated within a particular advocacy coalition or are 
evenly spread across the policy actor landscape. 
In this respect, at the core of policy debate in the Bulgarian energy domain is the market 
dominance of the Bulgarian Energy Holding /BEH/, a large, state-owned and vertically-integrated 
enterprise, incorporating generation, transmission and supply in both electricity and gas. The 
blueprint for consolidation of the Bulgarian power industry under a single holding company can 
be traced back to the privatization of NEC in 2000. Then, the largely reformist right-wing UDF 
government was firmly committed to pursuing a maximalist restructuring agenda based on the 
British model of complete vertical de-integration (Alexandrova, 2000). A radical turn in energy 
reform was strongly opposed by the industry elites, who favored a more conservative “gradualist” 
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approach of stage-by-stage restructuring (Ibid). The rationale was that vertical linkages between 
the newly created companies should be temporarily preserved within an integrated holding 
structure in order to ensure sufficient investment until regulated prices are phased-out (Ibid). 
Eventually, NEC was restructured, but the ambition to consolidate the (already privatized) 
companies lingered on to the next governments. In 2004 it loomed again when a state-level 
conflict over the partial privatization of power generators produced a modified consolidation 
rationale. This time the intention was to create an umbrella enterprise that would be responsible 
for restructuring the companies included in its structure in a more transparent way (Alexandrova, 
2004). This was the core argument utilized by the socialist-led government coalition in its quest 
to finalize the creation of BEH in 2008 (Alexandrova, 2008). Only 2 years later the new centrist 
government announced its plans to dismantle the company (which it deemed “unnecessary” and 
“parasitic”) (Dnevnik, 2010) but the initial impetus was ultimately lost. In this context, it could 
be argued that policy developments at the domestic level in Bulgaria ran in a direction opposite to 
what was being negotiated at the supranational level at the time of the elaboration of the third 
energy package. Therefore, the fact that Bulgaria supported Germany and France in devising a 
third less demanding unbundling option (Nenova, 2008) (which it later introduced in national 
law) should not appear particularly surprising. 
How to relate the entrenched position of BEH to the indicated gap between paper legislation and 
regulatory practice in the observed policy domain? The issue here is to what extent state capture 
can be considered as a critical nexus between the two. The first question to be addressed in this 
respect is how the structure of the Bulgarian energy sector reflects upon the reform processes 
within it. To start with, cramming together the bulk of power industry within a single state-owned 
entity inevitably entails a high risk of political influence over the functioning of the individual 
companies included in BEH (Interview EMI, 2013). On the one hand, the operation of the 
electricity grid is still within a subsidiary of NEC, which casts a shadow over its ability to 
provide non-discriminatory access to new market entrants. On the other hand, the efficiency of 
SEWRC as an oversight authority is compromised by government intervention in managerial 
matters (EC, 2012a) and doubts over its institutional and budget capacity to handle increasingly 
complex regulatory obligations (CEPET, 2012). In addition, the key role of SEWRC as a 
balancing mechanism in a tight, excessively regulated and non-transparent market increases the 
risk of strategic price manipulation in favor of the state-owned component of the market. For 
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instance, the SEWRC-approved revenues of NEC have steadily increased in the 2008-2010 
period in contrast to those of the three privately-owned distribution system operators /DSOs/ 
(Capital, 2011a). Hence, within the observed policy context there could be identified a core 
network of established relations between the state, state-owned companies, and the regulatory 
authority (“iron triangle”), targeted towards maintaining the dominant position of the existing 
vertically-integrated structure. As such it is in a direct conflict with the EU liberalization agenda. 
The structure of the Bulgarian electricity market is certainly a critical factor in measuring the 
potential for state capture in the studied policy environment. However, an important question that 
begs an explanation in this respect is whether the structure of the market is devised in such a way 
in order to provide opportunities for extraction. On the surface, electricity is a key sector in 
national economy, with significant financial resources at stake. In the Bulgarian case it is the 
most profitable state-owned utility, with BEH and its subsidiary energy producers providing a 
major source of revenue: in 2012 the companies included in the holding more than doubled their 
profits in comparison to the previous financial year (Antonov, 2012). Also, since 2009 80 to 
100% of BEH’s revenue is included in the state budget in the form of dividends (Interview EMI, 
2013). This is relevant as one of the major motives behind the creation of BEH has been to 
provide a financial backbone for large-scale energy infrastructure projects (such as the Belene 
nuclear plant and South stream gas pipeline) (Alexandrova, 2004). Therefore, it could be argued 
that the sector is perceived more as a source of income, where government intervention is 
intended to ensure the realization of particular goals, rather than through the necessity to develop 
a competitive market structure. 
Furthermore, the Bulgarian electricity sector is also highly susceptible to clientelist practices. A 
major issue in this regard is the specificity and high technical complexity of the engineering and 
maintenance activities, ensuring the functioning of the transmission network and existing 
generation facilities. This has led to the formation of a closed community of energy experts, 
either directly employed within the industry itself or operating consultancy services with major 
involvement in repairs tenders (Tchalakov et al., 2010). As stated in a recent report on the major 
governance issues in the energy sector “contractors implementing public procurement contracts 
awarded by the biggest energy companies are considered to be some of the most profitable 
businesses in the country” (CSD, 2010). This is consistent with Kitschelt, who identifies 
preferential access to government contracts as a major type of clientelist behavior, particularly 
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common in economic sectors, characterized by high level of political intervention, state-owned 
enterprises and monopsonic market structures (Kitschelt, 2011a). 
Another major arena of extraction identified within the Bulgarian electricity sector is the export 
of electricity (CSD, 2010). The concentration of clintelistic effort at the input (raw materials) and 
output (electricity production) end of the system dates back to the initial stages of the post-
communist transition. According to Tchalakov et al the high risks, associated with breaching the 
technological standards involved in managing the system, as well as the specific nature of 
electricity as a non-storable commodity prevented emerging corporatist structures from entering 
the core of electricity production (Tchalakov et al., 2010, p.127-129). Instead, those so-called 
“intermediaries”, operating under the auspices of the ruling party (the former communist 
nomenclature) focused their attention on the generated output (Ibid). In this regard there are 
indications that this model has remained unchanged to the present. As reported in the above 
mentioned study currently the state-owned NEC (which holds a monopoly on purchasing 
electricity for exports) carries its export activities primarily through intermediaries, who are seen 
as better adapted to market conditions. However, according to the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy those are “the same companies that controlled both the input and the output of state 
enterprises” (CSD, 2010. p.36). In this respect instead of “improving efficiency through the 
involvement of the private sector” privatization is identified as a process, cementing the influence 
of intermediary companies on state institutions (Ibid). In such an environment the imposition of 
EU rules and the resulting push towards devising a transparent and well-defined market structure, 
with clear responsibilities and relationships between the state, regulatory authorities and market 
players is expected to “lighten up” the on-going processes in the electricity sector (Interview 
EMI, 2013). 
To close the loop, a closer look at the rationale behind the creation of BEH may provide a clue to 
the element of intention in creating a non-transparent market structure. The main goals in this 
regard was to create a holding company that would at a later stage be responsible for selling the 
companies included in its structure, presumably at a better price (Alexandrova, 2004). Also, 
vertical integration was seen as a way to increase the competitiveness of the incorporated 
companies after the 2007 market opening, mitigate price increases for households and generate 
economies of scale (Ibid). A third goal is the improvement of investment potential through better 
control, supervision and increased accountability (Ibid). If the defined aims are considered 
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against the background of the EU liberalization objectives, namely effective restructuring, 
improving competitiveness and increasing transparency (EC, 2012a), two conclusions can be 
made. First, the two sets of goals match almost completely. Second, there is an obvious 
discrepancy in the method through which the desired changes are expected to take place – in the 
Bulgarian case it is through the creation of a vertically-integrated structure, while the EU 
rationale envisages the dismantling of the existing ones. According to expert opinions this reverse 
liberalization logic reflects a flawed understanding of competition, based on a firm intention to 
preserve the imbalances between state and privately-owned market segments (Ganev, 2008). 
Thus, liberalization in the “European” sense, taken to define restructuring into smaller companies 
without their actual privatization, is utilized to maintain the privileged position of a small clique 
of actors, sealed by strong government intervention in the absence of efficient democratic 
constraints (Tchalakov and Hristov, 2011).   
 
3.1.5. Increasing salience of electricity market liberalization in Bulgaria 
Finally, a critical factor that needs to be included in the explanandum is the level of 
salience of electricity liberalization as a policy issue appearing within the Bulgarian domestic 
discourse. To begin with, the existing debate on national transposition of EU regulatory 
requirements is conditioned by the closed and highly politicized nature of domestic discussions 
(Interview CSD, 2013). Thus, within the public space cost/benefit considerations are largely 
limited to the potential impacts on household prices. In this regard, the significant percentage of 
low-income households (Bulgaria had the lowest DGP per capita in the European Union in 2012) 
and the predominant use of electricity for heating have translated in high consumer susceptibility 
to price fluctuations and a marked public preference for cheap energy (Todorova, 2011). As a 
result, social pressures, induced by increasing electricity prices have targeted consumer 
discontent towards the privately-owned supply services (the three current suppliers are owned by 
ČEZ, EVN and Energo-Pro) (Report CSD, 2010) brought about by privatization and opening of 
the electricity market to international competition, which is associated with liberalization 
requirements. Also, nuclear power, produced at a lower cost by the existing national plant 
(Kozloduy), is favored by public opinion in contrast to the more expensive energy generated by 
renewable sources and foreign-owned coal plants (owned by AES and ContourGlobal), both of 
which are considered to burden electricity bills (Interview CSD, 2013). Consequently, parties 
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both within (the left-wing BSP) and outside (the radical right Attack) the political establishment 
have picked on calls for re-nationalization of suppliers (Petrova, 2013, Dimitrova, 2013), while 
labor unions have demanded reviews of existing long-term contracts with the “American” coal 
generators to account for sunk costs, and limiting the burdening “green” price supplements to a 
reasonable minimum (CITUB, 2013). Therefore, to the extent that liberalization appears within 
the Bulgarian public space it is linked with public perceptions oriented towards keeping the status 
quo and even reversing the direction of the liberalization process.  
On the decision-making level the present analysis has found evidence for the existence of an 
entrenched pro-status quo consensus. During the negotiation of the third EU energy package 
Bulgaria was among the opponents of the liberalization approach proposed by the European 
Commission. Particularly unappealing was the model of ownership unbundling, which was 
perceived as unjustified in light of the involved financial burdens and managerial difficulties. 
Moreover, the “economic soundness” of the model was also questioned by the Bulgarian side 
(Report OSI, 2009, p.28). In response an alternative approach was put forward focusing on 
rigorous regulation and increased supervision (Ibid), indicative of the strong pro-interventionist 
position of the BSP-led government. In this regard, supporting a more radical pro-liberal stance 
would have compromised the undergoing consolidation developments in the Bulgarian energy 
sector, associated with the creation of BEH. To what extent the taken position has been dictated 
by an intention to preserve existing distributive practices can be inferred from a recent survey. 
The latter found a strong positive correlation of two particular modes of clinetelistic effort (public 
procurement and regulative capture) in all three parties, forming the governing coalition at the 
time (BSP, NDSV and MRF) (Kitschelt, 2011a). The government stance has been questioned by 
the right-wing opposition (MRF and UDF), which initiated two parliamentary hearings in 
December 2007 and January and February 2008 (Lessenski, 2009, p.28). However, this has not 
resulted in visible turns in the pursued policy. The new center-right GERB government, which 
ascended in 2009, initially settled on a pro-reform course. At different points restructuring a la 
“EU requirements” (separation of the assets and managements of the transmission system 
operator /ESO/ from the owner of the grid NEC) (Nenova, 2009), dismantling (Katanska, 2010) 




On the policy and professional levels, however, there could be identified a wide pro-liberal 
coalition, outlining the involvement of a fragmented spectrum of actors. Here, the utilized 
rhetorical tactics and formulated demands largely coincide with European liberalization 
requirements, indicating a potentially high level of policy salience. In this regard the 
accumulation of pro-liberalization positions in the domestic context has proceeded along the line 
of defying the pro-interventionist character of government policy in the electricity sector. Thus, 
the efficiency and independence of the national regulator has become the focal point of the pro-
reform dispute, which mirrors EC conclusions, concerning the high level of political influence 
over the regulatory functions of SEWRC (EC, 2012a). In this respect the domestic policy debate 
revolves around the deficiencies in the price controlling mechanisms of the regulator, where 
instead of preventing upstream participants from using their monopoly position these are rather 
used to shield certain favored producers at the expense of consumers (CSD, 2010, Alexandrova 
and Ionkova, 2013a,b). At the same time consumers are effectively cut off the debate by lack of 
access to adequate sources of information (Interview EMI, 2013). As argued by a representative 
of an electricity trading company “the logical conclusion of all of this is that the intention is not 
to create a transparent, well-defined, market-based and working model, but to maintain a level of 
disinformation and conspiracy, if you want, around electricity, which is not perceived as a good 
for mass consumption, but as something mysterious and mythic, in order to work through other 
side schemes” (Alexandrova and Ionkova, 2013a,b). 
On the downstream distributors and suppliers have been at the helm of liberalization demands as 
a main target of both consumer pressures and pressures, stemming from excessive price 
regulation. In this regard low network tariffs and the low level of approved costs have 
consistently hindered their investment potential and the ability to maintain high service quality 
(Hinovksi, 2010, Capital, 2011a, Alexandrova, 2013a). Large industrial consumers operating on 
the free market have also pushed a pro-liberal agenda as the high level of market power in 
generation has constrained their choice of contracting parties to a limited pool of state-owned 
producers (in practice only 3, all of them subsidiaries of BEH) (Interview EMI, 2013). Moreover, 
according to the Bulgarian Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers /BFIEC/ selling the bulk 
of produced output on the export markets has led to speculative price increases for industrial 
consumption through disbalanced quantity allocation, neglecting internal demand. This has 
generated an “artificial deficit”, raising suspicions about manipulative practices on the wholesale 
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market (BFIEC, 2012). An active pro-liberalization stance is also voiced by electricity traders 
(organized under the Association of Traders for Electricity in Bulgaria/ATEB/) who have battled 
the access fees, determined by the system operator ESO and the high transmission prices for 
export, paid to NEC /Nikolova, 2013/. According to traders the complete “re-engineering” of the 
energy structure in the direction of extending the free market to all consumers and/or abolishing 
the intermediary position of NEC (in line with EU requirements) is the ultimate remedy to 
decreasing demand and removing burdens on prices (Ibid).  
 
3.2. CZECH REPUBLIC 
3.2.1. Background 
The liberalization of the Czech electricity market was fully accomplished in advance of 
the prioritized deadline for introduction of national regulatory arrangements in line with Directive 
2009/72/EC. Thus, legal provisions stipulating the separation of the transmission network from 
generation activities on the basis of the ‘’ownership unbundling” model – the approach preferred 
by the European Commission as a most effective tool for ensuring transparency and competition 
in the electricity market (EC) – were incorporated in the Czech Energy Act in August 2011 (Act 
458/2000). In practice vertical disintegration was achieved much earlier when the shares of the 
transmission system operator (ČEPS) were transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade in August 2009, making the latter a 85% majority shareholder 
with the rest 15% owned by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Moreover, within the 
same pool of legal amendments, the scope of obligations of the national regulatory authority 
(Energetický regulační úřad /ERÚ/) was extended to reflect the Directive requirements in regard 
to oversight efficiency and autonomy to control the duties and responsibilities, imposed by the 
Energy Act. In this regard ERÚ assumed full inspection responsibilities from the State Energy 
Inspectorate, while the independence of the regulator was further guaranteed by transferring the 
right of appointment of its chairperson from the Government to the President of the Czech 
Republic. Furthermore, the existing regime of end-consumer protection was significantly 
enhanced through improving the conditions for customer withdrawal from contracts, switching 
suppliers and providing access to relevant information regarding variation in wholesale prices 
(art. 11a). ERÚ was also vested with exclusive authority to protect the interests of customers and 
resolve disputes over the execution of contracts, obligations of contractors and access to the 
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transmission network (art.17). Therefore, in the Czech policy setting the incorporation of EU 
liberalization requirements within national legislation and regulatory practice was achieved 
according to schedule and in some respects anticipated European-level demands. Considering the 
largely divergent outcomes of policy progress in Bulgaria a major aim of the current analysis is to 
examine the contextual factors that are able to account for the observed discrepancy. 
3.2.2. State of the art in electricity liberalization reforms 
A brief examination of the policy developments in the Czech Republic from a historical 
perspective provides an opportunity to identify the extent to which EU inputs were reflected in 
policy decisions at the different staged of the liberalization process. As a starting point, a legal 
framework for electricity market liberalization was introduced with the adoption of the said state 
Energy Act in 2000. The established domestic market structure followed closely the prescriptions 
of the first EU package (Directive 96/92/EC), including the provision of equal conditions for 
access of third parties to the transmission network, separate accounting of vertically integrated 
enterprises, publishing of accounts, as well as setting up an autonomous energy regulatory office 
as a safeguard against undue distortions of competition. Moreover, in contrast to the Bulgarian 
case the previously utilized single buyer model was swiftly suspended by settling on regulated 
third party access, which at the time represented the most advanced approach to ensuring 
wholesale competition, prescribed by the EU (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). At a later stage, 
increasing the independence of the transmission system operator was achieved through legally 
unbundling ČEPS from the generator ČEZ until January 2005, in compliance with Directive 
2003/54/EC (Official Journal of the European Union, 2003).  
In addition, an ambitious plan for gradual market opening in retail services was included in the 
law, and later confirmed in the State Energy Policy of 2004 (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
2004). The plan envisaged the step-by-step extension of the category of eligible customers to all 
non-household consumers by January 2005 and all consumers including residential households 
by January 2006, a year and a half before the stipulated deadline (EBRD, 2010). 
Correspondingly, in sharp contrast to developments in Bulgaria, where regulated prices still 
account for around 70% of the market, in the Czech Republic the regulated price component was 
successfully phased-out by the time liberalization was completed, indicting a steady decrease in 
the level of government intervention. Currently, end-user prices are not regulated, with ERÚ 
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controlling network and service charges, while the price of energy itself is not a subject of control 
(ERÚ, 2009). The result is a very high switching rate, where the number of consumers changing 
their retailer in the 2010-2012 period has more than quadrupled (EC, 2012b). Also, on the 
wholesale market both large industry consumers and SMEs can purchase energy through bilateral 
contracts with either a retailer of a generator at market prices, while also entering into a separate 
system contract with TSOs or DSOs for the controlled price component (CMS, 2007). Thus, the 
intermediary role of NEC as a buyer and seller of electricity at fixed prices in the Bulgarian case 
has been successfully avoided in the current context.  
In short, the Czech case of electricity market liberalization shows all signs of timely and 
consistent reforms efforts in line and even sometimes preceding the regulatory requirements, 
imposed by the EU. Such a course of policy changes correspond to Joskow’s “ideal” textbook 
performance, where proper restructuring and the introduction of effective controlling mechanisms 
have been carried out to guarantee a well-functioning competitive market (Joskow, 2008). 
Therefore, in the Czech policy context the level of liberalization can be identified as high. 
 
3.2.3. Reform capacity 
A further, macro-analytical dimension takes into account the relevance of veto players as 
an explanatory variable, conditioning the likeliness of reform in the Czech policy context. As in 
the Bulgarian case in terms of formal veto points the Czech Republic is firmly situated in the 
majoritarian end of Lijphart’s democracy patterns scale, defined by a highly centralized unitary 
system of governance and administrative decentralization. A pronounced difference in the Czech 
context is related to the existence of a bicameral decision-making structure as a potential veto-
generating factor. Nevertheless, the relevance of this factor is largely marginalized by the 
medium strength of Czech bicameralism, where the upper house (Senát) does not have the power 
to veto legislation (Roberts, 2006). Also, a veto position can be overridden by an absolute 
majority of the Chamber of Deputies (Ibid). Therefore, bicameralism can be safely excluded from 
the explanandum at the federal/unitary level. 
A slightly more pluralistic outlook comes to the fore when the relevance of cabinet types and 
political system characteristics is applied to the Czech case. With respect to Lijphart’s model the 
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country’s political landscape appears to incorporate markedly more consensus features in 
comparison to the Bulgarian case. Thus, unstable governments controlling slim parliamentary 
majorities have been the norm in the years when electricity sector reform has been intensified by 
major policy developments at the EU level (2000-2012) (The Economist, 2011b). In this regard, 
the Czech Republic has seen a number of major cabinet reshuffles in the early 2000s, while the 
mandate of the right-of-center coalition formed in 2007 has been curtailed by a no-confidence 
vote two years later, to be succeeded by a caretaker cabinet. The first signs of stabilization came 
only after the 2010 general elections, when a stable majority coalition government was formed on 
a mandate of the right-wing ODS (Álvarez-Rivera, ?). However, the high veto potential, related 
to the prevalence of short-lived minority or unstable majority cabinets, is undermined by the 
observed increasing consolidation and bipolarization of the political spectrum after 2000 
(Hloušek, 2010). In this respect, the dynamics of party and electoral competition is largely 
determined by the right-left confrontation between ODS and ČSSD (Ibid). The relevance of 
proportional representation as a consensus trait is also restricted by a series of “build-in 
mechanisms designed to curtail excess political fragmentation” (5% electoral threshold for 
individual parties, 7% and 10% thresholds for electoral coalitions) (Klíma, 1998, p. 504). 
Thereore, the minimal ability of new interests to enter the political domain and and influence 
decision-making brings the Czech policy context closer to the majoritarian end of Lijphart‘s 
continuum.   
In regard to factual veto points the pattern of interest intermediation in the Czech Republic 
exhibits more pronounced majoritarian characteristics than its Bulgarian equivalent, defined by 
stronger corporatist arrangements and a consolidated mode of group formation (Roberts, 2006). 
The influence of the established national-level collective barraging mechanism (RHSD) was 
initially limited by its role as a purely consultative organ in the 90s (Myant et al., 2000), but it 
gradually gained new ground, particularly during the country’s preparation for EU accession 
(Hála et al., 2002). Labour unions and employers have also suffered less from decreasing 
membership (In 2008 the most influential confederation ČMKOS had more than 500 000 
members) (EFILWC, 2009). However, as observed by RHSD “has never become an institution to 
which draft legislation has to be formally submitted for observations” (Hála et al., 2002, p.9), 
hinting at its insufficient relevance as a source of veto pressure.  
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The last factor that needs to be taken into account in relation to veto points is the influence of 
informal practices on policy decision. At the macro-level during the transition period the Czech 
Republic was characterized by Hellman et al as a low capture state, less susceptible to clientelist 
effort in terms of party patronage, non-transparent party finance and legislative capture (Hellman 
et al., 2000,  p.21-23). O’Dwyer explains the lower level of party patronage in the country by 
hypothesizing a link between post-communist state building and the logic of party competition, 
where consolidated, usually bipolar party systems, defined by less fractionalization and electoral 
volatility (steadily decreasing in the Czech Republic in the 1990-2006 period) (Dwyer and 
Kovalčík, 2007), as well as the ability of opposition parties to constrain the government, lead to 
more efficient public administrations (O’Dwyer, 2006). As in the 90s the Czech Republic 
developed a “responsible” party competition pattern it was able to move quicker from early 
patrimonial to a rationalist Weberian type of bureaucracy, less responsive to clientelism (Ibid). 
However, there are indications that in the post-2000 period the effect of those early achievements 
has been reversed. As a result of increasing institutionalization, elitist party formation and 
diminishing membership base, Czech political parties have come to represent “narrow 
professional teams with organizational characteristics approaching those of a cartel, and where 
mass membership is deemphasized” (Hloušek and Šedo, 2010, p.13). This has led to a situation, 
where “parties often recycle the same personalities and reward loyalty rather than expertise” 
(Druker, 2012, p.187). Coupled with the persistence of informal contacts across the political 
establishment and the high level of exposure of politicians to informal networks (in fact identified 
to be higher than in the Bulgarian case) (Grødeland, 2007, p.235) such a trend indicates a high 
veto potential of clinetelistic practices. However, in contrast to the Bulgarian policy environment 
the Czech context is characterized by a higher degree of democratic consolidation, defined by 
higher governance efficiency (2.75 in Czech Republic, compared to 3.50 in the Bulgarian case) 
(Druker, 2012, Ganev et al., 2012) and judicial independence (2, compared to 3.25 for Bulgaria) 
(Ibid). Therefore, it could be argued that in the Czech case the veto power of clientelist behavior 
is restrained by more efficient democratic constraints. 
3.2.4. Power distribution and capture potential in the Czech electricity sector 
The main question to be addressed in regard to domestic power distribution is whether the 
policy equilibrium in the Czech context is tipped in the direction of a dominant interest formation 
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posing barriers to competitive interaction. In this regard, a wide domestic debate revolves around 
the dominant market position of ČEZ, a powerful state-owned enterprise, accounting for around 
70% of the total production of electricity in the country (EBRD, 2010). Moreover, ČEZ also 
holds a major market share in distribution and retail, where it controls the activities of 5 out of 7 
regional distribution operators (“REAS’’) through a vertically unbundled company (CMS, 2007). 
Thus, the level of market concentration in both generation and supply is identified as particularly 
high (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index /HHI/ ranks the country second only to France in terms of 
market power in generation) (Ondřich, 2010). It follows that although the separation of the 
transmission network from the competitive segments of the market (ownership unbundling) has 
been completed successfully in 2009 this process has not been accompanied by relevant measures 
at horizontal restructuring as a prerequisite for wholesale competition (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
The result is low competition in purchase prices as suppliers ensure their deliveries almost 
exclusively through the auctions, organized by ČEZ, which thus represent the main factor 
determining the wholesale price (CMS, 2007). Also, according to market experts the vertical 
integration of generation and supply activities has allowed the supply services incorporated in the 
ČEZ group to take advantage of the synergic effects of joint procurement from the dominant 
producer within the establishment to the detriment of other suppliers on the market (Kacvinský 
and Kadeřábková, 2008, p.3). Moreover, as the non-regulated price components account for 
approximately 66% of the price for industrial consumers (EC, 2012b) the latter have consistently 
attributed yearly increases to the monopolistic business practices of generators and suppliers, as 
energy and supply costs bear the major weight in end prices on the liberalized market (Morávek, 
2008, Thompson, 2011). Finally, the market framework of the Czech power sector shows all 
signs of high potential for margin squeeze, including a dominant position of a vertically 
integrated undertaking in the upstream market, ineffective downstream competition and lack of 
substitutes for the input of the dominant company in retail (OECD, 2010, Ondřich and Bebiak, 
2011). Therefore, in contrast to the Bulgarian context, where competitive distortions are 
associated with barriers to entry and excessive regulation, a somewhat opposite tendency could 
be observed in the Czech case – obstacles to efficient competition stem from high market 
concentration in generation, the limited number of market players, as well as the horizontal and 
vertical dominance of ČEZ.  
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A critical indicator of power concentration utilized by the current analysis is the potential for 
state capture in the domestic policy environment as a factor determining the direction of policy 
developments. Thus, the work strives to identify a relation between the dominant position of ČEZ 
and liberalization dynamics in the Czech electricity market. Clues leading to a tentative 
explanation come to the fore if the evolution of ČEZ is tracked in a temporal perspective. In this 
regard what becomes immediately obvious is that ČEZ followed a path of consolidation not 
dissimilar to processes in the Bulgarian power industry.  
At first ČEZ was partially restructured in the 90s, where the transmission network and the eight 
regional distribution companies owned by the former national energy company were transformed 
into joint stock companies (Kaderják, 2007). Also, in the mid-90s minority stakes in the DSOs 
were transferred to foreign investors and municipalities (Ibid), indicating a course towards a more 
competitive outlook in the energy sector. However, starting from the early 2000s a new pattern 
started to emerge. The change was not straightforward – privatization plans in 2000 included two 
opposing concepts put forward by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Ministry of Finance 
(Zemplinerová, 2000, p.7). The first proposed an integrated approach, envisaging the vertical 
integration of ČEZ with its restructured components into a single monopoly, which would at a 
later stage be sold as a single enterprise. The other, “fragmented” approach included the step-by-
step privatization of the separate production, distribution and transmission. Eventually the ODS-
led government settled on the former, proposing to sell all but 6% of its 67% interest in ČEZ to a 
single purchaser (Parker, 2002, p.31). The new owner would hold a vertically integrated power 
industry, controlling most generation and majority shares in 6 out of 8 regional distribution 
companies (Ibid). According to the plan the transmission network would be brought out of the 
vertical structure (ownership unbundling), a concept that would be incorporated in EU directives 
approximately 8 years later. Subsequently, privatization failed (bidders were turned off by the 
high price and the requirement to purchase high early amounts of brown coal) (EC, ?) but the 
plan was carried out – the state remained at the helm of a company holding a monopoly in 
generation, while until 2005 the government bought off its majority shares in 5 of the DSOs, 
which, however, were unbundled according to EU rules. Therefore, while the community-led 
process of market liberalization was on the move the Czech energy sector was undergoing 
processes of consolidation, which in contrast to the Bulgarian case did not interfere with 
European-level regulatory requirements. 
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A look at the core rational behind the consolidation of ČEZ may provide a further clue to its 
impact on liberalization progress in the Czech policy context. In this regard, it is argued that since 
the beginning of the company’s reorganization it was geared for expansion on the external market 
(Švehla et al., 2007). Thus, ČEZ underwent an extensive modernization program in the early 
2000s (Ibid), while it also acquired substantial coal capacities (the Severočeské mining company 
in which as of 2006 it owns 100% of the shares) (ČEZ, ?1) and commissioned new nuclear power 
capacities at Temelín (the first two reactors became operational in 2001 and 2003) (EC, ?). 
Consequently, the ČEZ group quickly became the second biggest power exporter in Europe (Ibid) 
and the largest per capita net exporter of electricity in the world (EBRD, 2010). Also, the 
company opened new businesses and made a serious of acquisitions of assets both in and outside 
the EU (the share of electricity sales to end customers abroad accounted for 31% of the total 
amount of sales in 2008) (Novaková, 2009, ČEZ, ?2). Combined with its monopoly position in 
generation and supply at home this means a massive profit generation, estimated at 52 billion 
crowns in 2009: more than the combined net profit of Czech Republic’s largest banks of that year 
(The Economist, 2010a). Considering the ownership structure of ČEZ, where the government 
holds around 67% of the company’s shares, such profit rates indicate an excessively large amount 
of financial resources at stake.  
In this regard, studies report a high level of symbiosis between the state and its economic activity, 
defined by an inextricable link between government spending and the profits of ČEZ, frequent 
appointments of company managers at political posts and vice versa, as well as unclear lobbying 
practices informing major policy decisions and national legislation in the energy sector, (Švehla 
et al., 2007, Bouda, 2008, Liška, 2008, The Economist, 2010a). Critics have questioned the 
expansive policy of the state-owned company, dictated by political interests and made possible 
through the low costs of coal generators, higher consumer prices at home and massive exports at 
the expense of domestic efficiency and modernization measures (Švehla et al., 2007).  Also, as 
due to its market share ČEZ has become impossible to overlook, the concentration of the political 
establishment on the profit maximization of a single company is viewed as an impediment to 
government capacity to create a level-playing field to the benefit of all market players in the 
sector (NH, 2009). As stated by a former Minister “ČEZ is a government agency more powerful 
than the government” (Švehla et al., 2007). Therefore, the Czech policy context can be 
characterized by a particularly high capture potential, with influence flowing between policy 
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actors (the state and a major market player) in a close-knit advocacy coalition. However, in 
contrast to the Bulgarian case, where capture is associated with government intervention in 
domestic pricing regulation as a shield to state-owned companies, the source of capture in the 
Czech context can be identified with maintaining the competitive position of the state-owned 
monopoly on the external market.  
It could be argued that in such an environment EU liberalization requirements represent an 
opportunity for benefit maximization through imposing market opening, where a strong company 
is able to expand its activity through acquiring assets in the newly liberalized markets. Moreover, 
the attached costs of liberalization - strengthening the supervisory capacity of the national 
regulator ERÚ and the unbundling of the transmission system operator ČEPS – could not be 
identified as bearing a major weight in domestic policy responses to EU inputs. The efficiency 
and independence of ERÚ have been significantly improved (although allegations of political and 
business influences have not ceased) (Léko, 2011), but of course the basic function of the 
regulator is to control the non-competitive segment of the market and not to interfere in its 
liberalized part (where ČEZ operates). Ensuring competiveness in the latter, thus, is solely in the 
hands of the Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (ÚOHS), the Office for Protection of 
Competition, which has launched several probes related to ČEZ acquisition deals (Johnstone, 
2011). In addition, although ČEPS has been fully unbundled through transferring it shares from 
the Ministry of Finance (responsible for the management of ČEZ) to two other Ministries its state 
ownership has remained intact. As observed by a domestic policy expert “The fact the majority 
owner of both companies is the state obviously does not bother the Commission” (Adámková, ?). 
Here, as in the Bulgarian case, liberalization along the EU-endorsed formula “restructuring 
without privatization” has had particularly strong reverberations. 
 
3.2.5. Low domestic salience of electricity market liberalization in the Czech Republic 
The processes of market opening and vertical unbundling were largely government led 
endeavors, following closely the prescriptions laid out in the EU directives in the absence of 
wider public debate (Interview ČEZ, 2013). This is consistent with critical observations 
indicating a closed nature of public-private relations in the country where a “narrow 
representative model of democracy has prevailed, which better suits the technocratically oriented 
 
63 
political elite” (Laboutková, 2009, p.22). In practice, in contrast to the Bulgarian case, issues 
related to the impacts of the liberalization process started to enter the public domain after the 
process itself had been completed (Interview ČEZ, 2013). Thus, domestic preferences mediating 
the outcomes of regulatory compliance have to be analyzed in regard to actor positions at the 
decision-making and expert levels.  
In domestic policy discourse liberalization is consistently linked with discussions on the degree 
of government intervention in economic activity, which in the context of the Czech energy sector 
translates into considerations over the privatization of ČEZ. In this respect there have been 
identified three principal coalitions within the political establishment, loosely corresponding to a 
somewhat moderate pro-liberal stance, a prominent negative position and a pro-status quo 
standpoint (Černoch et al., 2010). The first includes the right-wing ODS and the Greens /SZ/, 
with the former favoring partial privatization, while the latter has expressed a more pronounced 
position towards complete dismantling of ČEZ (Ibid). The second formation, consisting of the 
left-wing ČSSD, the rightist TOP9 and the hard-core communist party KSČM is generally 
opposing any efforts to undermine state control over the energy giant, with the latter also 
accentuating on strengthening government accountability in relation to its performance as a 
owner of ČEZ (Ibid). The middle ground has been occupied by the conservative KDU-ČSL 
(Ibid). However, a clear relation between party positioning on privatization and liberalization 
attitudes could hardly be established. For instance, ODS later revoked its intentions due to 
concerns over energy security and observed “turbulences” in the energy commodity market (HN, 
2010). Hence, such causation is not particularly relevant as a tool for tracking the evolution of 
policy developments in the Czech case. 
A definitive push towards regulatory compliance with EU liberalization demands rather came 
from a source unrelated to domestic preference formation. A brief overview of Czech 
involvement in the supranational negotiations, leading to the adoption of the third energy package 
can provide a possible explanation of the positive outcome of domestic adaptation. Here, the 
debate again revolved around the position of ČEZ as a state monopoly and the potential impacts 
of further unbundling on the outlook of the company. The position of ČEZ over ownership 
unbundling – the option proposed by the European Commission – was expectedly skeptical. The 
Czech national champion made clear its conviction that the separation of transmission and 
distribution could be achieved without the ownership unbundling of assets (EurActive.cz, 2006). 
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Moreover, ČEZ claimed that the observed lack of satisfaction among end customers with the 
results of the liberalization process so far is not due to unsuccessful unbundling, as indicated by 
the Commission in its green paper (EC, 2006), but should be rather attributed to infrastructure 
and energy security issues (EurActive.cz, 2006). Thus, the enterprise was more inclined to adopt 
the second best option /ISO/, while ownership unbundling was viewed as leading to “isolated 
network transmission systems” (Ibid). Accordingly, this was the position initially advanced by 
the Czech government. However, eventually it was considered “too radical” and full ownership 
unbundling was endorsed as the most relevant approach, applicable to the Czech context 
(Řiháčková, 2009). According to policy observers the explanation of this change of course lies in 
the Czech role as a balancing factor in the final stage of negotiations over the third package, 
which coincided with the Czech Presidency of the European Union. The expert team of the 
Presidency engaged in extensive trialogue discussions with the European Parliament and 
Commission, whose goal was to achieve a viable compromise in order to finalize the adoption of 
the package in 2009 (Král et al., 2009, p.49). Consequently, as observed by domestic energy 
exerts “the Czech Republic had also objections against ownership unbundling but the need to 
moderate negotiations during the presidency prevented Czechs from pushing through their 
interest too hard” (Mišík, 2010, p.15). Therefore, it could be argued that in the Czech case EU 
inputs worked not so much through altering the domestic opportunity structures but rather 











Conclusions and discussion 
The current diploma project has set out to study the impacts of transferring EU regulatory 
standards within the national legislation and implementation practice of new member states of the 
European Union. In this regard a core assumption informing the rationale behind the work is that 
the outcomes of rule transposition in policy settings, characterized by on-going processes of 
transformation may lead to results that vie or transfigure the intent incorporated in the initial 
regulatory design. At the same time the presence in domestic policy contexts of historically-
embedded specificities, such as high levels of state capture, clientelist practices and non-
transparent administrative procedures can mediate EU inputs in such as way as to ameliorate the 
existing gaps, rather than improve regulatory performance.  
 
In order to determine the relevance of this rationale the work has aspired to compare the 
dynamics of adjustment to EU regulatory rules in two new member states (Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic) in a specific area of EU governance: electricity market liberalization. The work builds 
on the observed discrepancy between outcomes of regulatory compliance in the two target policy 
contexts (full compliance in Czech Republic as opposed to lack of compliance in Bulgaria) and 
proceeds to disentangle the reasons behind the divergent outcomes. The aim of carrying out the 
envisaged comparative analysis has been to use regulatory compliance as a test bed in order to 
identify potential dissimilarities able to account for processes of selective adjustment to external 
rules. In this respect the work steps on a hypothesized causal relation between the existing 
patterns of power distribution within domestic actor constellations and the outcomes of 
regulatory compliance with EU liberalization standards.  
 
In order to substantiate a sufficiently comprehensive explanatory approach, applicable to the 
fulfillment of the set task, the work has drawn from a wide theoretical background. Thus, the 
current research framework follows the logic of the two key approaches found in Europeanization 
literature to study processes flowing in both top-down (the existence for pressures and incentives 
for compliance) and bottom-up directions (domestic factors underlying policy choices in the 
studied policy contexts). The domestic variables themselves are mostly drawn from policy 
compliance theory. Four variables have been identified as particularly relevant to the analysis at 
hand: the level of electricity market liberalization, the number and type of existing veto points, 
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the pattern of power distribution across existing actor landscapes and the level of policy salience 
within domestic policy discourse. Also, in order to capture the dynamics of policy development it 
has taken insights from theoretical conceptions on advocacy coalitions and policy equilibriums. 
In this regard the work has devised a causation relation, according to which the more the 
domestic pattern of resource distribution is tipped towards a dominant interest group (measured 
by the level of state capture within the particular context) the more unlikely is that policy change 
will occur according to time schedule or in accordance with prescribed outcomes. Consequently, 
the more consolidated the domestic actor constellation the more likely that EU inputs are 
perceived as a threat to existing practices, leading to pro-longed entrenchment. 
 
The results of the conducted research are presented in the table below: 
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As shown the two cases differ significantly in the level of implemented liberalization reforms. 
Bulgaria scores low on each of the three indicators used to measure the degree of electricity 
market liberalization – market opening, independence of the national regulatory authority and 
unbundling of vertically integrated structures. Market opening in retail was completed within the 
deadline, prescribed by European Commission (December 2007). However, as regulated prices 
have not been phased out as expected (fixed prices account for about 70% of the market) this has 
created opportunities for strong political intervention in the activity of the national regulatory 
authority SEWRC. Separation of the transmission system from generation and supply has not 
been completed and a government decision in this regard is still forthcoming. In the Czech case 
establishing retail competition was completed a year and a half before the term stipulated in the 
Directive (January 2006), while prices for end-consumers have been liberalized. In addition, full 
ownership unbundling had been carried out by September 2009, again before the prescribed 
deadline. The independence and supervisory efficiency of the national regulator ERÚ have also 
been significantly strengthened. Therefore, while in the Bulgarian case liberalization has lagged 
behind significantly, the Czech context shows all signs of full compliance with liberalization 
standards. 
Within the reform capacity dimension the two cases converge in regard to the limited relevance 
of formal and factual veto points as an explanatory variable. Both policy contexts are 
characterized by a highly centralized mode of governance, with weak potential of the established 
mechanisms for public-private interaction to generate veto positions. The Czech case exhibits a 
lower level of cabinet durability, which can be considered as a marker of a rougher balance of 
power. However, the significance of this specific feature is diminished by the stable bipolar 
pattern of party competition, which coupled with tougher electoral constraints, limits the 
possibilities for fragmentation of the political space. In any case in both contexts the ability of 
informal practices to influence the policy domain is identified as significant due to the 
specificities of the existing party systems (party elitism and cartelization, undercut by narrow 
membership bases) and in the Bulgarian case: the peculiar evolution of business-government 
relationships in the transition period. 
Visible differences start to emerge only after the patterns of power distribution within the energy 
sectors of the two countries are considered. On the surface both cases are identified by a highly 
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disproportional balance of power, skewed toward a powerful dominant actor coalition – the 
Bulgarian Energy Holding in the Bulgarian case and ČEZ in the Czech context. Both are state-
owned former monopolies and both operate vertically integrated enterprises. Also, the two 
companies have emerged out of a process of re-consolidation of the previously restructured 
national power industries. The rationales behind the two consolidation agendas also coincided – 
in both cases the major goal was to create a single entity which at a later stage would be 
responsible for selling the separate components included in its structure. Subsequently, the 
envisaged privatization dropped from the agenda in both countries.  
The two consolidation processes, however, differ in nature and degree. The Czech case indicates 
a higher level of consolidation, which nevertheless has proceeded along the lines of EU 
liberalization requirements: assimilation of most generation, distribution and supply, but 
excluding the transmission grid. Conversely, in the Bulgarian context consolidation was achieved 
through incorporating all segments of the market (in conflict to EU demands on unbundling), 
which, on the other hand, are individually more fragmented into separate entities.  
In both cases there are indications of a very high level of state capture, mediated by the degree of 
government intervention in the activity of the state-owned company, clientelist practices and 
existing competitive distortions. However, there are considerable differences in the nature and 
forms of extraction modes. In the Bulgarian case the high technical complexity of maintenance 
activities has resulted in the formation of a narrow group of connected expert companies, 
consulting or implementing most public tenders, as well as the concentration of clientelist effort 
on the input and output ends of the system, where the so-called “intermediaries” have been able 
to involve in exports. Therefore, in this case capture is not so much concentrated on the profits of 
the vertically integrated structure per se but rather on maintaining high barriers to entry in favor 
of individual actors operating across the vertical chain. In the Czech context barriers to 
competition stem not from unsuccessful vertical unbundling but from the high level of 
concentration in generation and supply in a liberalized market. Consequently, ČEZ has been able 
to capitalize on its strong dominant position at home to expand internationally and become a 
major exporter of electricity, accumulating significant financial resources to be managed by its 
state-appointed and controlled supervisory body. In practice this has resulted in a symbiosis of 
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the state and its economic activity at a scale unmatched by equivalent events in the Bulgarian 
case.  
The indicated levels of salience to a large extent reflect the findings of the work so far. Thus, in 
the Bulgarian case public salience of electricity market liberalization is identified as low, 
determined by the closed nature of the policy process, where the largely pro-status quo political 
establishment has prevented substantial reform efforts. At the same time the Bulgarian policy 
context has seen the emergence of a growing albeit fragmented pro-liberal coalition (suppliers, 
large and small industrial consumers, SMEs, policy experts), which has advanced EU rules as a 
remedy to continuing government intervention in the electricity sector, linked with the dominant 
position of NEC and the inefficient control of SEWRC in a heavily regulated market. Yet, so far 
the counterbalancing potential of intensifying mobilization has not produced a definitive agenda 
towards the completion of market liberalization. 
In the Czech case the opposite situation can be observed: a liberalization agenda has been carried 
out with policy salience scoring even lower. In this context the liberalization processes has been 
perceived as a predominantly technical affair, where a narrow understanding of public-private 
interaction has prevented strong outside input. In fact, as revealed, issues related to the 
liberalization process started to penetrate the public domain after the process itself has been 
finalized. However, this has to do with the distortive practices of ČEZ in the liberalized part of 
the market that is uncovered by EU rules. At the same time, in the Czech context a factor that was 
originally not included in the current explanandum is reported to have had a major importance in 
the observed shift in policy. It relates to the obligations of the Czech Presidency as a key 
mediator during the negotiation and finalization of the third EU energy package. The Czech 
position initially reflected the opposition of ČEZ against ownership unbundling but later softened 
considerably as a result of the need to reach the compromise, pushed by the European 
Commission and Parliament. Thus, supranational involvement and wider framing of the issue 
tipped the scale towards a more pro-liberal stance that at a later stage determined the pace of 
regulatory compliance in the country. 
In light of the established findings conclusions can be made in three key directions. First, in both 
cases EU inputs did not work through empowering an existing pro-reform coalition at the 
domestic level. In the Czech case no pro-liberalization interest group has been identified as a 
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factor in policy developments. In the Bulgarian case such a coalition has started to take shape but 
thus far it has been unable to trigger a process of equilibration that could lead to re-balancing the 
existing pattern of resource distribution. Although liberalization is increasingly salient in the 
domestic policy discourse and actors have formulated consistently more pro-liberal preferences 
this has not resulted in policy change. 
A genuine reform effort has been prevented by the existing policy monopoly, underpinned by 
powerful path dependencies, state capture and pronounced pro-status quo sentiments. Driven by 
strong self-preservation instincts it has protracted the establishment of a functioning competitive 
model, using liberalization as a shield to non-transparent practices. In this environment it is only 
natural that EU inputs have been perceived as a constraint, which corresponds to the identified 
causation pattern. However, as maintaining such an entrenched position eventually becomes 
unsustainable a major policy shift is expected in the near future. In fact, evidence confirming this 
trend is already present – in February 2013 a massive public protest over electricity prices 
toppled the Bulgarian government, revealing a practical collapse of the country’s energy sector 
which put liberalization in the eye of reform debates. 
Second, in both studied contexts the final say in policy decision regarding electricity market 
liberalization has been reserved for the dominant actor coalitions. This, however, does not mean 
that EU inputs have not altered domestic opportunity structures. As argued in the Bulgarian case 
EU liberalization demands have been largely embraced by actors outside the inert policy 
subsystem, which perceive external rules as an instrument to unplug the liberalization  process in 
order to attract new investment, minimize their expenses and accrue profit. Vertical unbundling 
and independent regulatory supervision have been seen as a challenge by an advocacy collation 
bent on keeping the existing competitive distortions and that position ultimately prevailed.  
The Czech case, however, illustrates a different pattern. While it can be characterized by an 
equivalent and arguably higher level of state capture electricity liberalization was accomplished 
on time. In a similar vein the Czech context indicates consistent restrictions on competition, 
albeit stemming from a different source. Although the dominant market player ČEZ consolidated 
the energy market it did so by permeating its liberalized segments, taking advantage of the lack of 
external pressures regarding privatization and market power. At the same time liberalization 
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provided access to external markets, while the envisaged vertical de-integration did not threat its 
dominant position at home.  
In the Bulgarian case the existing policy monopoly has striven to block reform efforts in order to 
benefit from distortions in the heavily regulated internal market. Conversely, in the Czech context 
the equally entrenched but outwardly-looking monopoly used liberalization as a tool for market 
expansion. In this environment EU inputs were perceived as an opportunity not by an existing 
pro-liberal coalition but by the dominant coalition itself. The latter found more benefit in 
accommodating to external rules, rather than in hindering the reform. Liberalization meant 
modernization, investment in infrastructure and ultimate profit maximization, while ownership 
unbundling was a small price to pay. This confirms the posed hypothesis that in new member 
states, characterized by transition sediments, selective domestic adaptation to EU regulatory 
requirements can exacerbate existing implementation gaps.  
Third, state capture is a significant factor determining the existing balances of power in policy 
areas, where EU governance operates through competitive selection. The work has found enough 
evidence to support the formulated hypothesis in both country cases, although according to 
patterns slightly diverging from the causal relationships identified in the research design. 
Developments in the Bulgarian context conform to the Europeanization mechanism, defined as 
changing opportunity structures. As EU inputs have challenged the existing institutional 
equilibrium they have created a framework around which both new and established actors have 
coalesced in order to counter the existing policy monopoly, attracted by the emerging 
opportunities. Nevertheless, the latter has adamantly resisted liberalization reforms. In the Czech 
case the existing policy subsystem embraced the new opportunities, while few outside actors 
have altered their strategic position in the policy domain. Hence, while domestic adaptation to 
EU regulatory provisions matched the preferences of different actors in the two contexts, the 
outcomes of regulatory compliance reflected the standpoint of the domestic actor coalition, where 
the most capture potential is concentrated. This suggests that Europeanization studies focusing on 
utility regulation should consider the relevance of state capture as a factor having particular 
weight in policy reform.  
As a final remark, the work has revealed a positive correlation between involvement in the 
supranational policy making process and policy shifts in the Czech policy context. This may be 
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taken as a proof that apart from downloading policy content in a top-down dimension, the 
increasing role of new member states in policy formulation and negotiation at the EU level alters 
the policy frame in which policy choices are made or implemented. A further line of research 
should concentrate more effort on studying this dynamic. Also, the work can benefit considerably 
from extending the devised research framework to new policy contexts in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In this regard further analysis can contribute new insights to the role of domestic actor 
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